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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyzes the factors that caused and sustained the 1975-1990 Lebanese 
civil war and aims to identify the main causes of the conflict. The author relies heavily on 
the Collier-Hoeffler Model but does not limit the list of causes of conflict to this model. 
The second part of the study is devoted to highlighting the costs of the 1975-1990 
Lebanese civil war with the explicit purpose of raising awareness among decision makers 
of the long-term ―lose-lose‖ nature of such conflicts. The paper concludes that the major 
causes of the Lebanese civil war were sectarian dominance within a confessional system 
and external factors that exacerbated the problem of divergent national identities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this paper is to research and identify the causes and costs of the 1975-
1990 Lebanese civil war, the longest and most costly civil war in Lebanon. Henceforth, 
when I use term ―civil war‖ without a specified year or qualification, I am referring to the 
1975-1990 civil war.  
 
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
The majority of armed conflicts in the twentieth century were civil wars and the 
trend continues in the twenty-first century. Civil wars are an important area of research. 
―In 2008, 16 major armed conflicts were active in 15 locations around the world, 2 more 
than in 2007… All of these conflicts are intrastate: for the fifth year running, no major 
interstate conflict was active in 2008.‖ 1  Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of the 
distribution of armed conflicts by type from 1946 to 2008 based on the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Base.  
I believe that the findings of this study should be of interest to those involved with 
studying, preventing or resolving civil wars. And given the plethora of geopolitical hot 
spots, this study should be of particular interest to those tasked with nation building or 
designing governing and electoral systems for new fledgling ―democracies‖ whether in 
                                                 
1
 SIPRI; ―Appendix 2A. Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1999–2008;‖ accessed on 3/17/10 at 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/02/02A 
2 
 
Iraq, Afghanistan or the Balkans – societies with pronounced sectarian and/or ethnic2 
divisions. 
Figure 1:  Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2008 
 
 
Types:    Internal; Internationalized; Interstate; Extra-systemic. 
Source:  Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, 2009, ―Armed Conflict, 1989-2008,‖ Journal of Peace 
Research 46 (4) July: 579.   
 
The section on the costs of the civil war emphasizes the long-lasting effects of the 
war on all sectors of the Lebanese people. Raising awareness could entice decision 
makers to consider the extent of the costs of armed conflicts and thus influence them to 
consciously choose short-term hard political decisions that could prevent long-term 
uncontrollable violence.  
 
                                                 
2
 Other than the Lebanese Armenians, the Lebanese do not differentiate themselves along ethnic lines. 
Instead, they are segmented along sectarian/religious lines.  
3 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/PAPER DESIGN 
This paper is a case study of the Lebanese civil war. It is based on the historical 
narrative and progression of events leading to the 1975 civil war. In addition, this study 
makes use of quantitative and qualitative analysis based on secondary sources, such as 
books, journals, think tanks publications and government issued data, to develop 
conclusions on the causes and costs of the conflict. 
Due to the complex and protracted nature of the Lebanese conflict, I had to 
consider the historical context of the civil war, to go back much earlier than 1975. To 
thoroughly study the causes of the conflict, especially to assess the social factors, this 
paper will provide a chronological review of the developments that led to the 1975 
conflict and will cover the major milestones of the Lebanese civil war. 
This paper is broadly based on testing Paul Collier‘s thesis regarding the causes of 
armed conflicts.  The Collier-Hoeffler Model
3
 was influential in the design of my study; I 
use it with other publications by Collier as the basis of this study.
 4
 I do not follow the 
Collier-Hoeffler research methodology; instead I use Collier‘s findings to identify a list 
of causes of conflict and then assess whether they were a factor in precipitating the 
Lebanese civil war. I will then supplement the analysis of the causes of the civil war with 
any other potential causes that might surface while researching this paper. So this study 
will include a social and historical perspective in addition to the economic, societal and 
political factors identified by Collier.   
                                                 
3
 Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Collier and Hoeffler (2004). 
4
 I did not follow one study of Collier‘s in particular. I used three books for sources of potential causes of 
conflict to be included in this study: 
Collier et al. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy; The World Bank and Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Bannon and Collier. Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions; The World Bank, 2003. 
Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It; 
Oxford University Press, 2007 
4 
 
In the last section of this paper I describe the cost of the Lebanese civil war. Even 
though such an armed conflict will have spillover effects to neighboring countries, for the 
purpose of this study, I will only examine those costs affecting Lebanon. I try to assess 
the human and social cost as well as the economic and long-term political effects of the 
war. Here I use various sources for conducting my analysis, mostly from secondary 
sources like the World Bank, IMF, books and publications on the Lebanese civil war.  
 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 While I use historical accounts to identify causes and costs of the conflict, this 
paper is not a comprehensive historical account of the Lebanese civil war. Historical 
accounts are included for background purposes and to help the reader make sense of my 
conclusions. The historical section of this paper is a tool to identify the causes and costs 
of the conflict. Given the absence of a strong central government during the civil war and 
lack of census data, this paper‘s conclusions are based on the cumulative historical record 
and findings of trusted literature. 
 This paper is a case study and thus its conclusions take into account the specifics 
of the Lebanese case and do not constitute a universal hypothesis. However, the lessons 
learned from the Lebanese experience, especially as related to sectarian or multi-ethnic 
societies and their political systems should be applicable beyond the Lebanese case. 
 This paper does not attempt to comment on the advantages of one economic 
policy versus another. Some sections contain discussions on attitudes of certain Lebanese 
communities towards their government‘s economic policies. I do not endorse nor 
condemn these views; I simply include them here to take into account the community‘s 
5 
 
views and perceptions and how these perceptions, right or wrong, impact their attitudes 
about sectarian violence.  
6 
 
Chapter 2: Historical Background 
 
Before I get into causes and costs, I will present a historical background of pre- 
and post-independent Lebanon. I believe this overview is important if one is to 
understand the complexity of the country, to put modern events in context, and to help 
identify the origins of the 1975-1990 civil war. 
 
2.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Modern Lebanon has been home to a variety of cultures and civilizations, giving 
it a rich and diverse ancient history. Lebanon's importance is due to its geographical 
position as the link between the Mediterranean Western world, Central Asia and India. So 
any regional power sought to gain control over this key segment of the trade route and 
with that came movement of armies and subsequently populations. Lebanon, part of 
ancient Syria, has been conquered by the Egyptians, Assyrians, Hittites, Persians, and 
Macedonians. Later it became a Roman territory and subsequently a Byzantine domain. 
The country fell to the Arabs in 633 CE. The land has since remained mostly under 
Muslim rulers, even though its rule often passed from one Muslim dynasty to another 
after the tenth century with the decay of the Abbasside Caliphate (750–1258) and rise of 
local dynasties. The Europeans were able to conquer parts of Syria during the Crusades, 
mainly the coast of what is today Lebanon. The Mamluks of Egypt reconquered the lands 
from the Mongol invasion of 1260 and held onto it until it fell to the Ottoman Sultan in 
1516.
5
  
                                                 
5
 Hourani (1946) 10-24 
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Due to its mountains the country was home to several minority communities, 
most prominent are the Maronites who arrived in the 8
th
 century, the Druze later, and the 
Shias who settled Jabal Amil.
6
 The mountainous terrain provided refuge for the 
heterodox communities like Maronites, Druz, Alawites, and Ismai'lis who fled 
prosecution from the dominant powers of their time.
7
 The Maronites arrived in what is 
today Lebanon from Syria during the late 7th and early 8th centuries; emigration from 
Syria intensified after Umar Ibn Abd-al-Aziz instituted discriminatory practices against 
Dhimmis, non-Muslim people of the pact of protection.
8
 The Druzes, people of an 
underground offshoot of Islam (considered heretics by Shias and Sunnis), arrived in 
Lebanon in the 11
th
 century. Druzism either disappeared or completely went underground 
elsewhere in the Muslim world except in the Chouf Mountains of Lebanon where they 
remain a strong tight nit community to this day.
9
  
Under Ottoman rule, these communities were given relative autonomy under a 
feudal system of prominent landowning families. Hitti describes this system: ―The head 
amir would parcel out the fiefs among subordinate shaykhs or amirs of his house. Their 
main duty was to raise and transmit taxes and tribute to him. He in turn would deliver the 
Porte‘s share to a neighboring pasha or directly to Constantinople.‖10  
The elite families could inherit their land and thus the feudal system was 
dominant till mid-nineteenth century.
11
 The same families remain in power today under a 
patronage system. By the mid-nineteenth century, the system was not a pure feudal 
                                                 
6
 Winslow (1996) 1-27. 
7
 Yapp (1989) 128-129. 
8
 Hitti (1965) 90-95. The ‗pact of protection‘ refers to the protection afforded by Muslim governments to 
citizens who are ‗people of the book‘ (i.e. Christians and Jews). 
9
 Ibid., 96-103. 
10
 Ibid., 159. 
11
 Zeine (1976) 22-3; Hitti (1965) 183. 
8 
 
system in the European classic sense of the 12
th
 and13
th
 centuries; it was a semi-feudal 
system nevertheless, with rents and taxes (miri) to the landlord. While there were a few 
free landowners, the emirs owned a majority of the land while the laborers worked on 
them and lived on them in subsistence conditions. The surplus was property of emirs or 
landlords who used it to pay the Ottomans (miri) and to provide largess to their own clan. 
Tax rates and crop sharing varied with the regional balance of power; the stronger the 
Ottomans, the more taxes the emirs had to pay and the less the laborers could keep.
12
 
 
2.2 PRE-MODERN HISTORY 
The Ottomans defeated the Mamluks on 24 August 1516 at Marj Dabiq in Syria 
and unseated them in 1517.
13
 When Sultan Salim entered Damascus, Lebanese chiefs 
went there to present their homage. The Sultan was particularly impressed with Amir 
Fakhr el-Deen al-Ma'ni's eloquent praise, and he bestowed upon him the title of "sultan of 
the Mountain," the Mount Lebanon of today. Thus the feudal system was institutionalized 
under Sultan Salim and continued till the latter part of the nineteenth century. Mount 
Lebanon had local autonomy as long as it paid tribute and taxes to the Sultan. The rest of 
modern Lebanon and Syria were under the rule of the different walis (governors) of 
Sham, Tripoli or Sidon. The Sultan was more concerned with serious threats to his 
domain, mainly from Persia and Egypt; Mount Lebanon was merely a thorn in his side.
14
 
The Ottomans remained the rulers of the Lebanon-Syria region until World War I.  
                                                 
12
 Kushner, David. Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation. 
See the chapter by Alexander Scholch (pp. 130-145) ―Was there a Feudal System in Ottoman Lebanon and 
Palestine?‖ 
13
 Zeine (1976) 6. 
14
 Hitti (1965) 143-144. 
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The Ottomans gave the communities living in Mount Lebanon local autonomy as 
long as they recognized the Sultan‘s sovereignty over the domain and paid tribute.15 The 
extent of Ottoman control varied with their relative geopolitical strength; however, they 
could intervene whenever they wished and did so on occasions when the local ruler 
crossed the line from autonomy to independence. For example, Amir Fakhr Al-Din II 
succeeded in achieving independence for a short period in the seventeenth century using 
personal prudence and an alliance with the Medici Grand Duke of Tuscany. However, the 
Ottomans regained the upper hand, defeated and executed Fakhr Al-Din II in 1635.
16
 This 
desire to be independent of prevailing regional powers and forging alternative foreign 
alliances will repeat itself often with disastrous consequences for the country. 
 The nineteenth century saw the major changes that eventually brought about the 
creation of modern Lebanon. Amir Bashir II ruled for over half a century, from 1788 to 
1840. During his reign, Lebanon was on its way to expansion, independence and 
establishing its role in the international relations of the region. Bashir II's history cannot 
be addressed here. It involved dealing with external powers like the Muslim Muhammad 
Ali of Egypt and European Christians, playing walis against each other and ruthlessly 
eliminating any local threats to his rule. He allied with the Ottoman army to fight the 
Wahhabis of Najd in 1810. Eleven years later he allied with Sidon's wali against the 
Damscus‘s wali, and then in 1831 he allied with Muahammad Ali against the Porte when 
the former sought the annexation of Syria. The Egypto-Lebanese government, however, 
overplayed its hand in Lebanon in its war with the Porte. Heavy taxation, forced labor, 
forced conscription and uprooting Lebanese trees for the Egyptian army all backfired. He 
                                                 
15
 Hourani (1981) 126-127. 
16
 Ibid., 129. 
10 
 
even used Maronites to disarm the Druzes, a severe transgression on the honor of the 
Druzes.  In 1840, the Lebanese in all their factions were united in their fight against the 
Egyptian army and fought "to restore their independence or die.‖17 After Britain came to 
the rescue of Turkey, Bashir surrendered himself to the British in October 1840 and was 
then sent to Constantinople where he died in 1850. The end of his reign marked the end 
of the emirate age. 
During the early 1800s, the Maronites numbers were increasing and their 
education improving with their close links with the Holy See. So they moved southwards 
towards rich farming areas into traditionally Druze districts.
18
 Christians profited from 
Western education, immigration to the New World, the silk trade and commerce with 
Europe. Influenced by French ideals and inspired by Greek successes against the Turks, 
the Maronites sought independence in a Christian Lebanon.  
The civil war of 1841 started with Maronites hunting on Druze land, ended with 
over 3000 people dead in sectarian fighting and increased European intervention in 
Lebanon to protect the Christians. The war might have started because of a hunting 
incident but it had its roots in Bashir II‘s reign when more Christians were migrating 
from Syria to the Chouf Mountains, long considered a stronghold of the Druzes. The 
Druzes feared that the Christians were gaining more prominence due to their openness to 
Western education and cultural influences. Johnson writes of the social mobility of the 
Maronites: ―in one generation, some Druze lords had found themselves in debt to their 
former 'serfs.'"
19
 Of course, Bashir, having used Maronites to suppress the Druzes revolt 
                                                 
17
 Hitti (1965) 184-189; Hourani (1981) 131. 
18
 Hourani (1981) 131. 
19
 Johnson (2001) 92. 
11 
 
in Hawran in 1840, must have only aggravated the schism.
20
 The war ended with dividing 
the mountain into separately ruled Christian and Druze districts, qaim-maqams,
21
 but the 
districts based on sectarian majority were nevertheless mixed (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Traditional Locations of Lebanese Communities (mid-1800s) 
 
Source: Winslow (1996, 33). Map denotes areas of religious majorities; no region had a pure religious 
representation. 
 
                                                 
20
 Hitti (1965) 191. 
21
 Hitti (1965) 193. 
12 
 
In the late 1850s, Maronite peasants revolted against their Maronite landlords in 
the North and redistributed farmlands. In 1860, buoyed by the success of their 
coreligionists‘ revolt in the North, peasant Maronites in the South led an uprising against 
their Druze feudal lords. Disorganized and leaderless, the Maronites were no match for 
the Druzes who were united and could leverage Muslim sympathies and Turkish support. 
The sectarian war even expanded to Syria and eventually claimed as many as 12,000 
victims.
22
 
French troops landed in Beirut in August 1860 after Fuad Pasha, the Ottoman 
visir, already had established order. An agreement was reached in 1861 between the Porte, 
France, Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia. Having lost all legitimacy, the qaim-maqam 
system was abolished and replaced by a mutassarfiyyah, governorship, ruled by an 
Ottoman Christian approved by European Powers with council representatives elected on 
a communal basis. Sunni Muslim towns were excluded from this entity.
23
 The grave 
precedent was the establishment of a council based on sectarian quotas - still present to 
this date - and the personalization of politics. 
Several authors cite the 1860 civil war as the flashpoint that erupted sectarian 
hatred to the surface.
24
 The collapse of the feudal order after the peasant revolts of the 
mid-1860s  and Bashir‘s policy of pitting Maronites against Druzes awakened sectarian 
tensions. Hourani attributes this change to internal and external factors: "At the moment 
of crisis, communal feeling, stimulated from outside and not held in check by a common 
authority, turned into religious hatred."
25
 
                                                 
22
 Hitti (1965) 194-195; Hourani (1981) 132-135. 
23
 Hitti (1965); Hourani (1981). 
24
 Hitti (1965); Johnson (2001); Hourani (1981) 
25
 Hourani (1981) 134. 
13 
 
 
 
2.3 MANDATE AND INDEPENDENCE 
After joining the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the Turks 
deposed of the last Mutasarrif in August 1915 and ruled Lebanon directly thus ending the 
Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifiyah.
26
  
A secret agreement was reached between Sir Mark Sykes (British) and François 
Georges-Picot
27
 (French diplomat) on dividing up Greater Syria and Iraq into French and 
British spheres of influence (see Figure 3). Russia was also involved in the agreement to 
secure areas closer to its sphere of influence but after the success of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, the Russians pulled out and revealed the terms of the agreement.  
On the 7
th
 of October 1918, a French division landed in Beirut. France was given 
a mandate over Lebanon and Syria in April 1920 during the San Remo conference. 
General Gouraud (French) defeated Arab forces at Maysalun and entered Damascus on 
July 25, 1920. Greater Lebanon was proclaimed by the French Commissioner on Sept 1, 
1920 to include the coast and Biqa'. The Mandate was approved by the League of Nations 
in July 1922. Greater Lebanon now included a significant Muslim population that was 
against French rule and in favor of Sherrifian rule. May 23, 1926, the French declared 
Lebanon a constitutional republic.
28
  
It is worth spending some time here on the attitudes of the different Lebanese 
communities towards the French Mandate, because herein lies some of the early causes of 
                                                 
26
 Hitti (1965) 203. 
27
François Georges-Picot (1870-1951) was a professional French diplomat with long experience in the 
Levant and had served as consul-general in Beirut. Sir Mark Sykes (1879-1919) was a noted traveler, 
English politician, diplomatic adviser to the British Cabinet on Middle Eastern affairs and a close confident 
of Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War during WWI.  
28
 Hitti (1965) 217-221; Hourani (1946) 55.  
14 
 
the subsequent civil wars: a divergence in the attitude towards national identity between 
the Muslims and Christians.
29
 
 
Figure 3: Control Zones per the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
 
Source: BBC. ―The Sykes-Picot agreement;‖ accessed on 3/21/10 at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_document
s/1681362.stm  
 
The Lebanese Christians and particularly the Maronites were the only
30
 group in 
favor of an independent "Greater Lebanon…with expanded borders and under French 
                                                 
29
 The divergence in the national outlook was already pronounced by the late nineteenth century: ―while the 
Christians of Lebanon wanted political reforms and political independence, the Muslim Arab intellectuals  
in the rest of the Ottoman Empire sought to cleanse and to strengthen the Empire by advocating 
administrative reforms and a return to the purity of Islam and Muslim institutions‖ (Zeine 1976, 61). 
30
 Hourani writes in page 146 of Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essary, ―"The Catholic Christians were the 
only wholeheartedly pro-French element in the population of the Mandated Territories…"  
15 
 
rule."
31
 Several Maronite delegations to Paris in 1919 relayed their desire for an 
independent or autonomous Lebanon under one form of French rule or another.
32
 Sunni 
Muslims, and Shias to some extent, were against being ejected from a greater Ottoman 
empire, where they belonged to the ruling political community to become a minority 
under Christian rule.
33
 The Majority Sunni population of Greater Syria was represented 
by Faysal Ibn Husayn at the Paris Conference of 1919 and wanted an Arab state 
including today's Syria and Lebanon with concessions to minorities and European 
powers.
34
 An American commission was sent to the region to verify the delegates‘ claims. 
The King-Crane Commission concluded the majority wanted independence under an 
Arab State and that only the Catholics preferred French rule; if there was to be a mandate, 
the local population would accept one under American or British rule but not French 
rule.
35
 Ultimately, the "King-Crane commission recommended keeping geographical 
Syria as a united political entity under Amir Faysal."
36
 
While the Maronites were a majority in Mount Lebanon and had long eschewed 
an independent republic, one has to consider the overall demographics of Greater Syria 
(including Lebanon) to understand the Muslim, particularly the Sunni, opposition to 
French rule and the creation of Greater Lebanon as a separate state from Syria. Sunnis 
were 58% of the population of Greater Syria and the Muslims totaled 76% of the 
population. The Sunnis were never part of Mount Lebanon during Ottoman days and they 
                                                 
31
 Hourani (1946) 50-51. 
32
 Yapp (1989) 322. 
33
 Anti-Turkish sentiment was mostly limited to the Maronite Lebanese; whereas, the vast majority of Arab 
Muslims did not desire to overthrow or destroy Ottoman rule. In fact, there is no historical evidence to 
support the view that Arabs suffered from backwardness due to the Ottomans, but benefited materially 
more than any other people under Ottoman rule (Zeine 1976, 15 & 36). 
34
 Yapp (1989) 322. 
35
 Yapp (1989) 323-324. 
36
 Hourani (1946) 52. 
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considered themselves citizens of the Caliphate under direct Ottoman rule either from 
Damascus or Beirut.
37
  
The French were aware that most Sunni Muslim and Arab nationalists were 
hostile to French rule. Therefore, French policy was to strengthen those segments of the 
society that were pro-French - in Lebanon, that would be the Maronites – and "the 
corporate spirit and separatist feelings of the minorities were deliberately fostered and 
were made the basis of the political divisions of the Mandated Territories."
38
 France was 
more concerned in maintaining its own position
39
 than in training the people for home 
rule. Nationalistic feeling and national leaders were suppressed.
40
 Hourani believes this 
was one of the reasons for settling the Christian Armenians in Lebanon. French policy 
was geared towards linking Christian interests with France's by favoring Christians, 
especially the Maronites, in administrative and political positions and by "playing upon 
their fears of Moslem persecution."
41
  
The confessional system
42
 was already established under the Ottomans in Mount 
Lebanon; the French only continued this tradition. The 1922 representative system was 
                                                 
37
 Hourani (1946) 126-127. 
38
 Hourani (1947) 68. 
39
 France had strategic and economic interests in Lebanon: an investment of about one billion francs in 
Greater Syria around the time of WWI; Syria and Lebanon were France‘s second greatest import region in 
the world after Palestine and its second export market after Great Britain.  
The mandate was a strategic possession to maintain France's status as a Mediterranean Power: a base for air 
route connections with Far East possessions and an oil-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli which was a major 
supply source for France‘s armed forces (Hourani 1946, 153-155). Hourani cites the ―Ministére des 
Affaires Etrangéres, Rapport, 1938, p.203.” 
French diplomats knew this very well. The French Ambassador to Britain said: "…in Lebanon and in Syria 
we have special and long-seated interests which we must see respected…‖ (Zeine 1976, 101) 
40
 Hitti (1965) 221. 
41
 Hourani (1947) 69. 
42
 Definition in Wikipedia: ―Confessionalism is a system of government that distributes political and 
institutional power proportionally among religious communities. Posts in government and seats in the 
legislature are apportioned amongst different groups according to the relative demographic  composition of 
those groups in a society, which is seen as a way of formally recognizing the communal political rights of 
indigenous groups. Currently, the political system of Lebanon is modelled [sic] in such a way, and the term 
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based on religious representation, a confessional system. General Sarrail, the French High 
Commissioner, tried to abolish the confessional system for a secular system, but this was 
objected to by all religious communities. The confessional system was preserved by the 
1926 Lebanese Constitution under Jouvenal.
43
  
France suspended the Lebanese constitution in 1932 due to the continuing 
"squabbles" among Lebanese factions. This move had the effect of uniting the Lebanese 
factions and France had to restore the constitution by the terms of the Franco-Lebanese 
Treaty of 1936. France again suspended the constitution in 1939 due to WWII. The 
different Lebanese factions were unified again under President Beshara al-Khoury. The 
Lebanese Chamber
44
 ratified the constitution without any mention of France.
45
 The 
French Commissioner arrested the Lebanese leaders (including Khoury). Lebanese 
protests and British pressure
46
 forced France to release the Lebanese leaders, and 
eventually the Lebanese secured their independence on November 22, 1943.
47
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
is usually associated with Lebanon.‖ I believe this definition precisely describes the Lebanese political 
system, at least as intended in the constitution.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confessionalism_%28politics%29 accessed on 5/25/2010.  
43
  Yapp (1996) 105-106. 
44
 The Lebanese Representative Council was established in 1922 under the French Mandate. Original there 
was a elected Chamber and a nominated Senate. They were later merged into one Chamber (Hourani 1946, 
172-180).  
45
 In 1943, the Lebanese leadership demonstrated by its revision of the Constitution (without any mention 
of France) that "the greater part of the politically conscious Lebanese desired an extension of autonomy" 
and were no longer willing to tolerate French interference as was possible under the mandate system 
(Hourani 1947, 73-74). 
46
 British forces were present in Lebanon since 1941 and the Lebanese benefited from Anglo-French rivalry 
in their struggle for independence (Hourani 1981, 140). The Lebanese were united in their opposition to 
France. Lebanese notables, Muslim and Christian, agreed to accept the independence of Lebanon but also 
to be independent of France and to acknowledge that Lebanon is part of the Arab world (later codified by 
Lebanon by being one of the founding states of the Arab League). 
47
 Yapp (1996) 106-108. 
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2.4 POST-INDEPENDENCE 
The Lebanese inherited an electoral system designed to pit the various religious 
groups against each other to the benefit of the French, rather than as a representative tool 
to solve national problems democratically.
48
 The National Pact came into existence at 
Independence, an unwritten understanding among the Lebanese: the Maronites would get 
the presidency, the most powerful position in the government; the Sunnis, the prime 
minister‘s office; and the Shiites, the Speaker of the Parliament. Also, the Maronites kept 
the army commander‘s position, the Druze the Defense Ministry; other positions were 
similarly reserved along sectarian lines. The House of Representatives seats were divided 
by a ratio of 6 Christians to each 5 Muslim representatives. Such a system breeds 
nepotism, social fragmentation, sectarian strife, and patronage politics. The outcome was 
inefficiency, waste, and well-founded or not, feelings of inequity. The National Pact was 
supposed to deliver a confessional system that reflected the relative weight of the 
religious groups. The problem is that this was based on the 1932 census, whereas the 
demographic reality had changed much by 1943.
49
 
The first and last census was in 1932 and at that time Lebanon was 48.8 percent 
Muslim and 50 percent Christian; the Maronites were no more than 29 percent – see  
Table 1 for sectarian demographic composition from 1922 to 1996. No census has been 
conducted since due to political reasons; unofficial demographic surveys today show that 
Muslims outnumber Christians two to one.
50
 While the Christians were a clear majority in 
Mount Lebanon (four-fifths) in 1932, they barely had a majority when adding all the 
territories of Greater Lebanon per Maronite demands. By 1943 their majority was eroding 
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 Winslow, 78-106. 
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Yapp (1996) 108-109. 
50
 Andrews, John. ―A question of faith;‖ Economist,  vol. 338, Issue 7954, pp.15-17, 2/24/96 
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and the trend was obviously in favor of the Muslim population due to higher emigration 
rates among the Christians and higher birth rates among the Muslims, especially the 
Shias.
51
 The problem of the confessional system had already started, ―The percentages 
given for these groups…overestimated the Christian proportion and underestimated the 
weight of the Shia population. Nevertheless, they formed the basis of the division of 
power agreed primarily by Maronites and Sunnis.‖52 
                                                 
51
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52
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Table 1: Confessional Composition of the Lebanese Population (1922 - 1996) 
Yapp Est . Stewart Est.
Confession
1922 
Pop'n
1922
%
1932 
Pop'n2
1932
%3
1943 
Pop'n
1943
%
1975
%
1984 
Pop'n
1984
%
1988 
Pop'n
1988
%
1996
%
Shia N/A - 154,208 19.6% 200,698    19.2% 30.0% 1,100,000 30.8% N/A - 33.0%
Sunnis N/A - 175,925 22.4% 222,594    21.3% 20.0% 750,000    21.0% N/A - 20.0%
Druze N/A - 53,047   6.8% 71,711      6.9% ~10% 200,000    5.6% N/A - 8.0%
Muslims Total 273,366 45% 383,180 48.8% 495,003    47.3% 60.0% 2,050,000 57.3% 2,308,063 65.2% 61.0%
Maronites N/A - 226,378 28.8% 318,201    30.4% 25.0% 900,000    25.2% N/A - 20.0%
Greek Orthodox N/A - 76,522   9.7% 106,658    10.2% - 250,000    7.0% N/A - 8.0%
Greek Catholics N/A - 45,999   5.9% 61,956      5.9% - 150,000    4.2% N/A - 6.0%
Other Christians N/A - 43,645   5.6% 64,603      6.2% - 225,000    6.3% N/A - 4.0%
Christians Total 335,668 55% 392,544 50.0% 551,418    52.7% 40.0% 1,525,000 42.7% 1,234,522 34.8% 38.0%
Jews N/A - 3,518     0.4% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Others N/A - 6,301     0.8% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.0%
Total Population 609,034 100% 785,543 100.0% 1,046,421 100.0% 100.0% 3,575,000 100.0% 3,542,585 100.0% 100.0%
Census Hourani Est. Johnson Est. Faour SurveyCensus
 
 
Source: Adapted by Author from Jonson 2001 
Data Sources: 1922 census figures from Faour (1988).  
1932 census figures, and 1943 estimates from Hourani (1946), p. 121.  
1975 estimates from Yapp (1996, p. 277). 
1984 estimates from Johnson (1986, p.226).  
Faour's numbers are based on a 1988 survey that was a by-product of the summer 1988 food assistance program.  
1996 estimates from Stewart (1996, p. 292) based on Phares 1995 and Economist 1996 survey.  
Note: No official census since 1932. All demographic numbers since are estimates.  
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Also, significant government positions were ―inherited‖ within the same family, 
usually the same feudal families that ruled pre-independence, often referred to as the 
zu’ama.53 Of 35 cabinets formed after independence, 31 were led by only four Sunni 
families. The ―leading feature of Lebanese politics was the predominance of notables. By 
independence the ingredients of success in politics were established. They were a 
landowning base and local followers, urban wealth, modern skills and good alliances.‖54 
The post-independence period coincided with the issue of Palestine reaching its 
zenith just before the United Nations was deliberating the Partition question. After 
receiving 150,000 Palestinian refugees in 1948, the issue of the loyalties of the Lebanese 
came into question – Christian-European or Muslim-Arab. The refugees, mostly Sunni, 
could not be integrated because of the significant effect that would have to the balance of 
power per the confessional system; the Palestinians were mostly settled around Beirut in 
refugee camps.
55
 The economy was highly politicized and corruption was rampant
56
. 
Officially, the country had a laissez-fair system; nevertheless, businessmen had to liaise 
with politicians if they were to conduct business freely. ―Liaisoning‖ could mean bribes 
(bartil or rashawi), a cut of profits, preferential treatment due to family or sectarian 
connections, or sometimes the politicians would get involved in national business 
ventures themselves. The extreme was out right embezzlement, for example, a third of 
the supply department was embezzled in 1944 with no investigation.
57
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 One example are the Feudal lords in Akkar, northern Lebanon, who built their power as landlords during 
the French mandate and prevented development in their region to prevent the government from interfering 
in local peasants lives to keep them within their control (Owen 2000, 224).  
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At the same time, Lebanon was building a nation in a Cold War contested area. Several 
Arab states, including Egypt and Syria, were leaning towards socialism and thus getting 
closer to the Soviet Union, while others, such as the Gulf Kingdoms, were more 
traditional and staunchly anti-communist. Lebanon was pressured to choose sides, and 
again there was no Lebanese consensus on the issue. 
 
2.5 THE CHAMOUN ERA, 1952-58 
This is the period of the rise of Arab nationalism under Egypt‘s Nasser, who was 
bolstered by his victory in the 1956 Suez Crisis and the nationalization of the Suez Canal. 
President Chamoun was pressured by a sympathetic Muslim majority to the Nasserite 
regime. After the unification of Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in 
1958 and a revolution in Iraq overthrew the monarchy, there was jubilation by Muslims 
in Lebanon and threats that Chamoun would be next.
58
 Defeated in the 1958 elections, the 
leftist opposition went to the street. The opposition was also discontent with the 
distribution of government benefits, especially new Shia migrants in Beirut suburbs, and 
they united under the leadership of Kamal Jambulat of the Socialist Progressive Party, the 
Sunni Sa'ib Salam and opposition Christians, chiefly the Maronite Patriarch and some 
Orthodox Christians. So the president invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine claiming that the 
Muslims were supported by pro-Soviet Syria and the U.S. sent the battleship New Jersey 
with 5,000 troops to prop-up Chamoun. "Between 2,000 and 4,000 casualties occurred 
primarily in the Muslim areas of Beirut and in Tripoli‖ in violent confrontations between 
the opposition and government forces.
59
 The 1958 civil war saw two major developments:  
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The new features [of the 1958 events] were first the international dimension and 
the way groups in Lebanon sought to enlist outsiders by representing their 
struggle as part of the Cold War of the fight or the fight for Arab Nationalism: 
and second the involvement of the urban poor. In the longer term these two new 
elements would threaten the Lebanese political system as it had existed 
hitherto.
60
 
 The 1958 civil war revived the identity question that has troubled the country 
since the establishment of Greater Lebanon: Christian independent with a Western 
outlook or Muslim pan-Arab.
61
 
 
2.6 THE RISE OF SHIHABISM, 1958-64 
The army commander Fuad Shihab, who had refused to intervene in the 1958 civil 
war lest he were to divide the army, was elected after the 1958 civil war. He asked 
American troops to withdraw, increased Muslim participation in the government while 
keeping Christian majorities (in both the Cabinet and Parliament) and referring to the last 
civil war he declared "no victors, no vanquished." Shihab tried to maintain Lebanon's 
independence and preserve its neutrality in the regional struggle and Cold War. He 
improved relations with the Arabs. He also increased the role of the government by 
offering more services and benefits to the historically disenfranchised communities the 
Shias, the Druz and the poor urban Sunnis.
62
 The urban wealthy were dissatisfied but the 
biggest reaction came from the poor he tried to help or empower:  
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There was a more fundamental contradiction in the policies of Fu'ad Shihab. It 
was to be expected that merchants and big business would resent the extension of 
state power but economic modernization also tended to turn acquiescent rural 
populations into discontented urban dwellers. The more prominent the role of the 
state the more importance was attached to the manner in which power was 
distributed within it.
63
 
Yapp‘s insight above throws an important light on one of the potential causes of the civil 
war in Lebanon: the politicization of the economy. The greater the role of the government 
in the economy or the perceived bounty from capturing the State, the greater the risk of 
violence ventures.
64
  
 
2.7 THE HILU ERA, 1964-70 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war erupted during Charles Hilu‘s presidency, elected 
September 1964.
65
 More Palestinian guerilla fighters entered Lebanon. Starting in 1964 
the Palestinians were conducting military trainings in refugee camps and by 1968 they 
started using Southern Lebanon as a base for raids against Israel. The country was again 
divided between pro-Palestinian Lebanese Muslims who believed in the Palestinians right 
as freedom fighters and anti-Palestinian Lebanese Christians who wanted to stay neutral 
and preserve Lebanon‘s independence. No Sunni prime minister would take action 
against the Palestinians, so president Hilu relied on the Deuxieme Bureau, a military 
intelligence unit, to control the Palestinians.  In 1968, Israeli forces attacked Beirut 
airport as retaliation for a Palestinian raid raising internal tensions. Also, clashes between 
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Palestinian fighters and the Christian-controlled Lebanese army escalated in 1969.  A 
Lebanese-PLO agreement was reached in Nov 1969 in Cairo resulting in a cease-fire and 
limiting PLO operations to the South with a commitment not interfere in Lebanese 
politics.
66
 However, Israeli reprisals led to a massive internal migration (30,000, mostly 
Shia) from South Lebanon (Jnoub) to Beirut
67
. The issue of Muslim migrants not getting 
appropriate support and shelter from Christian leaders added to the sectarian tensions. 
 
2.8 THE FRANJIYYEH ERA, 1970-76 
Lebanon had to deal with another influx of heavily armed PLO guerrillas after 
their expulsion from Jordon by King Hussein in 1970 (Black September). There were 
some 300,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. The new arrivals considered Lebanon a launching 
pad for attacks against Israel. More Shias fled the South to Beirut and started joining 
radical groups. The government had to avoid aggravating the Muslim pro-Palestinian 
demonstrators while controlling the spread of violence, Palestinian attacks and Israeli 
reprisals. President Franjiyyeh could not use the full power of the Lebanese army against 
the Palestinians as the Maronites would have wished for several reasons: no Sunni leader 
would agree, Syria threatened to intervene, and the Lebanese army would split because 
the officer corps was dominated by Maronites but its rank and file were mainly Muslim 
Shias.
68
 
The situation escalated into more clashes between the Lebanese Army and 
Palestinian guerrillas, more internal divisions, resentment within the Shia community in 
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the South for the indifference of the Lebanese authorities to their plight, and eventually 
Lebanon had to deal with the repercussions of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, mainly an 
increased Palestinian presence and divided domestic loyalties.  
 
2.9 CIVIL WAR BREAKS OUT, 1975  
By early 1975, Muslim Leaders, Druzes included
69
, were demanding a reduction 
in the power of the Maronite president in favor of Muslims to accurately reflect the 
population changes since 1932 and balance the sectarian representation in the army. The 
Phalanges militia, Maronites, wanted to use the Lebanese military to bring Palestinians 
under control but no Muslim government representative would agree to the use of force 
against the Palestinians.
70
  
In April 1975 four Phalangists were killed. Suspecting Palestinian involvement, 
Phalanges gunmen killed twenty-six Palestinians passengers in a bus. Random sectarian 
killing ensued and the situation escalated to an all out war by June 1975 dividing the 
country into two camps: a Christian "status quo coalition" and a Muslim-PLO "revisionist 
coalition."
71
 People began leaving areas of mixed sects to the safety of more 
homogeneous regions. The Lebanese army split along sectarian lines and the Muslim side, 
the Lebanese Arab Army, joined the LNM (mostly Muslim-Left) and jointly attacked the 
presidential palace.  
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 The LNM almost defeated the LNF (mostly Christian-Right) with the aid of 
Palestinians from Syria. Syria had a pivotal role in the development of events in 1976.
72
 
First, Syria intervened on the side of the Muslim coalition in January 1976 with 
"American acquiescence" and Israeli "tacit agreement" for a limited intervention to 
resolve the conflict.
73
 By February, Assad of Syria reached a reform plan with President 
Franjiyyeh, but when it was refused by the Muslim camp, President Assad dispatched 
more military units in the March-May period to aid the Christian
74
 camp against the 
Muslim-PLO camp.
75
 By the Fall of 1976, under Saudi and Arab public opinion pressure 
for allying with Maronites against Muslim Sunnis – Syria is a majority Sunni state ruled 
by an Allawite minority – Assad, Lebanon and the PLO reached an agreement in Riyadh 
in October 1976.
76
 The Syrian Army‘s presence was legitimated by the Arab League 
under the ADF in 1976.  
 The 1975-76 civil war had cost the country gravely. ―Although the exact cost of 
the war will never be known, deaths may have approached 44,000, with about 180,000 
wounded.‖77 The population partly "regrouped" along confessional lines: Christians in 
Eastern Beirut and Northern Lebanon, Druzes in the south of Mount Lebanon, and the 
Shias presence in Beirut suburbs was more pronounced. The Palestinians were the 
dominant force from Western Beirut to the Litani River. Syrian forces, under the Arab 
Deterrent Force, were the ultimate arbiters of Lebanese politics. The Lebanese state 
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suffered most. It was impossible to hold elections after 1972 and the government did not 
just lose its monopoly on the use of force but was not even able to use some force without 
having its army disintegrate as it did in 1976.
78
  
 Johnson concludes that the Palestinian presence was the most important factor in 
triggering the 1975 civil war. That is not to say that there were no other internal factors 
that contributed to the civil war, but the Palestinian presence certainly strained the system 
beyond its breakpoint. The Maronites, fearing Palestinians, Muslims and leftists, built 
their own militias as "surrogate protectors of the state."
79
 The confessional system lasted 
as long as the confessional bourgeois zaims were united in their interest to stabilize the 
system with the least conflict and minimal government intervention.
80
 Yapp agrees with 
Johnson on the effect of the external factor but adds another major factor: "the challenge 
to Maronite dominance by other groups within the Lebanese system."
81
 I believe that 
both factors were crucial for the 1975 war: the internal factor could have been resolved 
peacefully if the Palestinian presence did not divide the Lebanese ideologically along 
sectarian lines, and the Palestinian presence would have been dealt with more effectively 
had all the Lebanese believed their political system to be fair and equitable.   
 
2.10 THE SARKIS ADMINISTRATION, 1976-82 
The main issues of the Lebanese problem remained unresolved after 1976: a 
domestic conflict between the status quo forces and the reformist coalition who 
squabbled about the "identity of the Lebanese entity and the distribution of power within 
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the Lebanese state and political system;" Syria's hegemony over Lebanon was enforced 
with 30,000 Syrian soldiers; the Lebanese could not agree whether the Palestinian armed 
presence was a sacred right or a violation of Lebanese sovereignty; and Israel's activities 
in Lebanon intensified due to the increased Syrian and Palestinian presence which now 
threatened its national security. The Lebanese Christians after being saved by Syria, came 
to see Syrian presence in Lebanon as an occupation and under the new leadership of the 
young charismatic Bashir Jumayyil, they were determined to maintain the political status 
quo and expel the Palestinians and Syrians with Israeli help.
82
 
Syria had assumed control of Lebanon but had two serious powers to contend 
with, the Palestinians in the South and the Phalange in Christian areas. After several 
clashes with Christian rivals and even killing prominent Christian family members, 
Bashir Jumayyil was the undisputed leader of the Christians by 1980. Bashir was 
practically running a Christian state in 1980. He had a small army "trained and supplied 
mainly by Israel" and military service in the Maronite militias became mandatory in 1981 
for all students.
83
 Confident of their growing power, the Phalange under Bashir, had their 
eye on taking strategic Zahle – two hours from Damascus - from Syrian control. Syria's 
response was ferocious with heavy and sustained bombardment.
84
 Israel gave limited aid 
to the Maronites by shooting down two Syrian helicopters. Syria responded by deploying 
surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. So the situation in Lebanon escalated to a regional conflict, 
but was contained ―through the mediation efforts of other Arab nations and the United 
States.‖85 
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Syria gave the Palestinians relative freedom in the South to the detriment of the 
Lebanese locals, the Shias and Maronites. The Lebanese government tried to establish its 
control over southern Lebanon in 1978-79, but with Israeli and Major Sa'd Haddad's 
(SLA Commander) objection, several attempts ended with failure and eventually Sa'd 
Haddad declared the area under his control in the south as ―Free Lebanon‖ and 
effectively defected to Israel. The Lebanese government stripped him of his rank and 
declared him a traitor.  
In 1978, Israel launched a massive air bombardment on PLO positions in the 
South and West Beirut and invaded Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian incursions and 
shelling of northern Galilee from South Lebanon and occupied all the land south of the 
Litani River, about ten percent of the country, causing thousands of casualties. The 
Israelis withdrew after three months at the request of the UN and were replaced by UN 
Interim Forces.  
The Shias were affected the most from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Around 
200,000 people migrated from the South to Beirut and surrounding suburbs creating what 
was later called the ―misery belt.‖ The Shias86, led by Imam Musa al-Sadr, started the 
―Movement of the Deprived‖ (al-Mahrumeen), which later became Amal.  
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 This period also witnessed major developments in the geopolitics of the region. 
By the late 1970s, Egypt's role had declined with the Camp David Agreement, and 
America viewed Syria's role in Lebanon through the Cold War lens. Syria became the 
Soviet Union‘s main ally in the region after Egypt signed the peace agreement and 
Syria‘s relationship with PLO warmed enough to allow them freedom of operation in 
Lebanon. Syria was now using Lebanon as part of its defense strategy: the Biqa' was the 
main route to invade Syria by Israel and south Lebanon could be used as a launching pad 
for a Syrian assault on Israel. The 1979 Iranian Revolution saw an increased role for the 
Iranians in Lebanon to enhance the status of the Shias.
87
 
Between 1980 and 1982, clashes broke out all over the country. There were Shia-
PLO clashes in the South, Maronite Phalange against Maronite Tigers,
88
 automobile 
bombings in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, assassinations of religious leaders on both sides, 
and kidnappings of foreign diplomats.  
 
2.11 THE ISRAELI INVASION, 1982 (al-Ijtiyah) 
In 1982, Bashir Jmayel was the undisputed head of the Phalange and Maronites in 
Lebanon. He had secret talks with the Israelis
89
 to encourage them to invade and 
promised a peace treaty if he became president.
90
 With the presence of Syrian SAM 
missiles in Lebanon and active PLO fighters, on June 6, 1982 Israeli soldiers crossed the 
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Green Line
91
. The Israeli army destroyed Palestinian positions in the South and Syrian 
missile sites. It also reached Beirut and laid siege to West Beirut – the Muslim part of the 
city – while the Eastern side was free of Israeli forces under Phalangist control.  
Lebanese estimates, compiled from International Red Cross sources and police 
and hospital surveys, calculated that 17,825 Lebanese had died
92
 and over 30,000 had 
been wounded during the Israeli invasion of 1982. In Lebanon: A Country Study, Thomas 
Collelo describes the carnage:  
Normal economic activity was brought to a standstill. Factories that had sprung up in the 
southern suburbs were damaged or destroyed, highways were torn up, and houses were 
ruined or pitted by artillery fire and rockets. Close to 40,000 homes--about one-fourth of 
all Beirut's dwellings--were destroyed. Eighty-five percent of all schools south of the city 
were damaged or destroyed. The protracted closure of Beirut's port and airport drastically 
affected commerce and industry. By 1984 the World Bank (see Glossary) and the CDR 
agreed that Beirut would require some US$12 billion to replace or renovate damaged 
facilities and to restore services that had not been properly maintained since 1975.
93
  
All seemed to be going as the Israelis planned. Bashir was elected as president in 
August 1982 with half of the country under Israeli control, but he reneged on his promise 
of a peace treaty with the Israelis. Bashir was assassinated in September before his 
inauguration. Two days later, avenging their leader, Phalanges militiamen committed the 
Sabra and Shatilla massacre with Israeli "consent" when Israel had total control over 
West Beirut.
94
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Under the eye of Israeli forces,
95
 Phalange elements entered two Palestinian 
refugee camps and massacred some 2000 civilians, mostly women, children and babies.
96
 
The exact number is highly disputed and varies from ―at least 800‖ 97  up to 3500 
according to Amnon Kapeliouk, an Israeli journalist.
98
 Robert Fisk, one of the first 
Western journalists to be present at the massacre scene, believes around 2000 were 
slaughtered in the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camp.
99
 The United Nations General 
Assembly condemned the massacre and declared it to be an act of genocide.
100
  
The PLO agreed to leave Lebanon for Tunisia after the siege of West Beirut left 
the city demolished, and with the guarantee that a Multinational Force (MNF) would 
protect the Palestinians to prevent another massacre. American, Italian and French troops 
were stationed in West Beirut, followed by a few British troops. 
The Israeli Invasion, starting as retaliation for Palestinian raids and an attempt to 
neutralize the Palestinians in Lebanon, ended up changing "the internal balance of power 
between Christians, Shi'i, and Druze militias."
101
 The Israeli Invasion was the cause of 
the rise of the Shias in the South, their traditional heartland, as they filled the vacuum left 
by the PLO with the creation and ascendance of Hizbullah.
102
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2.12 CHAOS AND END OF WAR, 1982-90
103
  
By the fall of 1983, the Israelis started to withdraw due to continued casualties 
from Lebanese resistance, mainly from the Shias. Israel withdrew first to the south from 
Beirut to the Awwali River, and then left the Southern front to the defected SLA under 
Antoine Lahd.
104
  
With the Palestinians gone and a weak Lebanese Army, this created a power 
vacuum. One more time, war escalated in late 1983 in Mount Lebanon between the Druze 
and the Maronites, then between the Druze and the Lebanese Army. The opposition 
(Druze, Sunnis, and Shias) defeated the Maronite militias in the Mountain. The Druze 
gained complete control of Chouf Mountain. The U.S.S. New Jersey came to the aid of 
the Lebanese Army, who was clashing with the Druzes, to declare a cease-fire. Shortly 
after, the Shia Amal militia clashed with the Lebanese Army in Western Beirut. The 
MNF withdrew after a series of suicide bombings that caused over 300 casualties among 
the French and Americans
105
.  
By 1984, Assad had the upper hand: his allies controlled two-thirds of Lebanon 
and the resistance to Israel had forced it to retreat and leave a 'security zone' under the 
SLA‘s control.106  
Then, from the mid-eighties till the end of the civil war, Lebanon descended into a 
series of turf battles:
107
 War of the Camps, Ilgha’a (elimination) battles, Liberation 
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Battles, pro-Syrian fighting anti-Syrian factions, Christians against Christians, Muslims 
against Muslims, Palestinians against Palestinians and Shia against Shia.
108
 
After the parliament failed to elect a president in the summer of 1988, the 
departing president, Amin Jemayel, appointed the Army Commander, a Maronite, as 
prime minister and left the country without a president.
109
 General Aoun was supported 
by Saddam Hussein who wanted to decrease Iranian intervention in Lebanon through 
Shia militias. The country was again divided along sectarian lines with two governments: 
a Muslim one in West Beirut and a Christian one in East Beirut. Aoun, with Lebanese 
Army backing, launched the War of Liberation (Harb al-Tahrir) against the Phalange 
militia to consolidate his hold on Christian East Beirut. 
Eventually with Arab mediation, the last elected parliamentarians convened in 
Tai‘f, Saudi Arabia and agreed on a new accord, the Tai‘f Agreement, where for the first 
time the parliament was divided equally between Muslims and Christians. With Arab and 
American backing in exchange for support for the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, 
Syria deposed of Aoun in October 1993 using its air force and installed the agreed upon 
Tai‘f government.110 All militias were dissolved except for Hizbollah, which kept its 
arms restricted in the South and out of sight with the implicit agreement that Hizbollah 
would keep its role as a resistance movement and never use its arms internally. Since 
1991, elections have been held regularly; however, results remain along sectarian lines 
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since the Tai‘f Agreement institutionalized sectarianism, which heretofore was 
implicit.
111
 
Syria was the biggest winner from the Lebanese Civil War and the Ta‘if 
agreement allowed Syria to keep its forces in Lebanon theoretically for two years but 
practically indefinitely. Syria forced the Lebanese government to sign two treaties in 
1991. Lebanon signed a defence pact and Syria gained control of Lebanon‘s foreign 
policy. Syria was allowed to keep its forces and security apparatus in Lebanon, meddle in 
Lebanese politics as the final arbiter and even enforce the "exclusion of [Lebanese] 
authority from certain regions."
112
 Two Thousand Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
remained in the Biqa' and 3000 SLA defected soldiers remained in the South. The end of 
the war brought one main benefit to the Lebanese State: once the government was formed 
it set about disarming the militias. All were disarmed except for those allowed to keep 
their weapons with Syria's blessing, Hizbullah, or with Israel‘s protection, the SLA. 
There was no major internal violent conflict between 1990 and 2008; however 
there were several Israeli invasions and attacks since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war. 
Israel withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000.
113
 The Lebanese government still claims 
that the Shaba‘ Farms are occupied while Israel says they are not Lebanese territories.  
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Chapter 3: Causes of War 
 
In this section, I will discuss the causes of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 
1990. I will first assess the potential causes of conflict as identified by Collier, and then 
add any other causes I have found during my research. To keep the analysis simple and 
manageable, I will discuss each probable cause individually and assess its impact on the 
civil war.  
 Before presenting my findings, I will start with a brief overview of the major 
conclusions of the Collier-Hoeffler Model. In Collier‘s own words:  
After testing for a number of factors, Collier and Hoeffler find that three are significant—
the level of income per capita, rate of economic growth, and structure of the economy, 
namely, dependence on primary commodity exports. Doubling per capita income roughly 
halves the risk of a civil war. Each additional percentage point of growth reduces the risk 
by about 1 percentage point. The effect of primary commodity dependence is nonlinear, 
peaking with exports at around 30 percent of gross domestic product [see Figure 
4]…Ethnic and religious composition also matters. Societies in which the largest ethnic 
group accounts for 45 to 90 percent of the population—which Collier and Hoeffler term 
―ethnic dominance‖—have a risk of conflict about one-third higher…Once a country has 
had a civil war, its risk of renewed conflict rises sharply, although this risk fades 
gradually over time at about 1 percentage point a year.
114
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Figure 4: Natural Resources and Conflict in Low-Income Countries 
 
Source: Bannon and Collier (2003) 3.  
  
3.1 GEOGRAPHY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
Lebanon sits on the far east of the Mediterranean in the middle of three 
continents--Europe, Asia and Africa. So its location cannot be considered a cause of 
conflict insofar as being a hindrance to economic performance – quite the contrary. The 
rich history, moderate climate and diverse geography (from Alps-like mountains to 
pristine beaches in less than 30 minutes) have been a blessing for the tourist industry, a 
major driver of economic activity. Yet some consider this important geopolitical location 
a curse as it invites external meddling from the powers that be.
115
 Lebanon does not have 
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any major commodity exports like oil, gold or high-value cash crops. This drove the 
country to adopt a liberal, open economic system to differentiate itself in a historically 
more statist region to drive growth. The country‘s relatively liberal financial and banking 
secrecy laws attracted regional foreign investments in the service sector. So the lack of 
oil or other commodity exports might have been a blessing in disguise inasmuch as this 
was one less potential conflict driver to add to the country‘s overall risk of civil war. 
While the Lebanese economy does not have commodity exports that expose a country to 
external price shocks, its the heavy reliance on oil imports, tourism and the banking 
sector exposed Lebanon to regional shocks as well as international demand shocks and 
commodity price shocks.  
―The share of the tertiary sector (finance, commerce, transport, education, health) in the 
gross domestic product increased from 62 percent in 1950 to nearly 72 percent in 1970, 
one of the highest rates in the world… In 1965 it was estimated that 68 percent of the 
value added in the services sector was sold to foreign customers; this was equivalent to 
some 32 percent of the GDP!‖116 
Anytime there was a regional war or simply worries of a conflict the tourism 
sector would come to a standstill. Similarly, the banking sector was geared towards Arab 
oil money that started looking for alternative markets for investment after the 1967 War. 
Thus a big portion of the Lebanese economy was tied to regional stability in the most 
volatile region of the world. This exposure left long-term growth prospects vulnerable 
and many times the risks materialized and people‘s livelihood suffered, increasing the 
risk of conflict. 
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3.2 HISTORY OF CIVIL WARS 
A history of sectarian conflict that dates back to the nineteenth century was never 
forgotten and the traditional ruling families could raise sectarian animosities to mobilize 
vast swaths of the society at their whim. Most ominously is that the ruling elites, feudal 
and large landowning families, that were involved in the historical sectarian conflicts 
continued to rule in one form or another, either through direct involvement in politics or 
patronage. Once a country has had a civil war, its risk of falling into another civil war is 
ten times higher than before the conflict started, after which this risk decreases year by 
year.
117
 Lebanon‘s history of civil wars helps explain the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War, 
15 years, and the failure of many truces and signed agreements to hold. Before the 1975-
1990 civil war, Lebanon had several shorter and less destructive civil wars – discussed 
above in the review of the country‘s history, with the most significant one going back as 
far as 1860, and more recently the 1958 civil war. This history of civil wars entrenched 
sectarian hatred, weakened social capital and diminished the goodwill needed among 
people to prevent them from resorting to violence in trying times.   
 
3.3 SECTARIAN DOMINANCE
118
 
Daniel Pipes put it best: ―the Maronite dilemma resembles that of the whites in 
South Africa: Both groups have a distinctive, centuries-old identity, both pride 
themselves on cultural ties to the West, and both wish to keep a majority of the 
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population politically subjugated.‖119 The Maronties resorted to raising militia forces in 
the 1970s for fear of losing their status quo privileges after the ascendancy of pan-
Arabism and increased Palestinian
120
 military activities in Lebanon.
121
 
The inequitable governing system developed under the French Mandate was built 
with colonialist interests in mind and not as a true representative structure. ―The 
Lebanese confessional solution was no longer adequate to the loads and demands of the 
present situation. The situation was beyond the rational management of the leaders.‖122 
The Lebanese cannot continue, however, to pin the blame on the French Mandate. The 
heart of the problem was a confessional system that no longer reflected the demographic 
changes on the ground: by 1975, Lebanon was 60% Muslim
123
 and Shias were the largest 
community. Many attempts were made to revise the confessional system but the 
Lebanese factions could never agree on a revised political system.
124
 
The parliament was divided along sectarian quotas that favored the Christian 
Maronites and the top three positions were also divided along sectarian lines. Christians 
refused to equitably share political and economic power with the Muslim majority.
125
 As 
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economic conditions of Muslims lagged behind those of the favored Christians, sectarian 
tensions grew and the traditional politicians, zu’ama, were able to take advantage of these 
grievances for personal benefits.  
 
3.4 GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION 
The sectarian political system fostered and reinforced cronyism and clientelism 
(Za’ama). The society was highly politicized along sectarian lines. The country adopted a 
laissez-fair economic system from the beginning and reaped higher levels of growth than 
most of its neighbors. Still, there were inherent inefficiencies due to corruption and the 
use of largesse by politicians to ensure loyalties and continued support.
126
 
Rabinovich, a political scientist, observes that the conservative system aimed at 
conserving the status quo; religious and traditional leaders kept their power and their 
strength was practically instituted. The political and electoral system consolidated the 
position of the zu'ama at the expense of the development of cross-sectarian political 
parties with national agendas. The system called for election of parliamentary members 
through regional lists; therefore, the za'im could carry the whole region and have his men 
as representatives in the parliament in a locked system of patronage. The ―Lebanese 
system acquired an archaic complexion" because it solidified the regional za'ama 
(lordship) at the expense of the national identity.
127
 
                                                                                                                                                 
only way the faster-growing Muslim population could adjust the system to reflect the demographic reality 
was by taking up arms" (Hiro 1993, 200) 
126
 It should be clarified that compared to other governments of the region, the Lebanese government 
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 ―Although the Lebanese were tolerant of political venality up to a point, they had 
been sorely abused in recent years. Corruption and favouritism pervaded the whole 
system – including the bureaucracy and parliament as well as the presidency.‖ 128 
Contracts were not granted based on the highest bidder or lowest cost but on favoritism. 
Wasta, a rampant form of corruption, became the norm for employment as people did not 
expect to get a job unless they had wasta, a powerful ―mediator.‖   
 
3.5 TOO MANY PARTIES TO PLEASE 
While on the face of it, the conflict might have been Muslim-Christian or 
sectarian, the truth is that there were too many parties to satisfy: various Lebanese 
Christian and Muslim sects (eighteen sects with several political parties each); pro-Soviet 
or pro-American Lebanese; Nasserite/pan-Arabic or Independent Lebanese; pro-
Palestinian, pro-Syrian or pro-Israeli Lebanese; Palestinians; Syrians; Israelis; French; 
Americans; Soviets (formerly); Iranians; Egyptians; Saudis; and Iraqis. Whenever a truce 
or an agreement was made between two or three parties, there was always a fourth, a fifth 
who felt betrayed or ignored and resorted to violence to achieve their aims. And 
predictably this violence was met with more violence and hence such violence never 
achieved the desired results.  
 
3.6 UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Uneven development between the urban and rural areas: Beirut was the most 
developed part of the country while rural and especially South Lebanon was ignored by 
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the central government.
129
 The government provided basic services in the capital and 
Mount Lebanon, like roads, infrastructure, schools, universities, hospitals, telephones, 
and ports; without these it was hard to attract investors to the agricultural South. 
Lebanon‘s economy was still based on patronage and allocating government spending to 
the ―connected.‖ 130  The fact that the majority of undeveloped rural areas were 
predominantly Shia and in some places Sunni - Saida and Tripoli - led to associating 
underdevelopment with sectarian loyalties, as the government was perceived as a tool of 
the politically dominant sect, the Maronites, instead of a government for all the Lebanese.  
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the disparity between the South and rest of the 
country, along with high levels of violence in the undeveloped South led to massive 
migration to Beirut.
131
 ―By early 1975, 40 percent of Lebanon's entire rural population, 
including 50 percent of the rural population of the Beka'a and 65 percent of that of south 
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Lebanon had been driven out of their homes and off their land‖132 because of uneven 
development, violence between Palestinians and Israelis, and sometimes between 
Palestinians and Lebanese Southerners especially as the PLO became the major armed 
group in the south. This migration continued ―to stream to Beirut (75 percent) and to 
foreign countries (25 percent). Thus, on the eve of the civil war, the crisis and the 
depopulation of the Lebanese countryside were at an advanced stage.‖133 Eventually, 
clashes increased between migrants from rural areas (especially South Lebanon) with the 
more affluent and sometimes indifferent Beirutti inhabitants.  
The top twenty percent of the Lebanese in terms of income strata had 61% of total 
income for the 1945-1980 period.
134
 According to Muller there is a correlation between 
inequality and the stability of democracy: ―A very strong inverse correlation 
is…observed between income inequality and regime stability for a sample of 33 
democracies.‖135 High levels of inequality in a country like Lebanon would lead to an 
unstable democracy or as actually happened in the 1980s to absolute anarchy. 
This does not contradict Collier‘s finding (see Figure 5) that ―At low levels of per 
capita income, political institutions tend to be less stable in democracies than in 
autocracies.‖ 136  Collier is considering income levels, whereas, Muller is considering 
inequality levels. Also note that authoritarianism is more stable than democracy only at 
lower income levels, less than $1,000 in 1995 US dollars. Lebanon‘s GNP per capita was 
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much higher than this on the eve of war; it was over US $1,000 in 1972 using 1976 US 
dollars.  
There are no researchable Gini Coefficient values for Lebanon. However, I did 
come across a paper from the American University of Beirut studying inequality and 
armed conflict in Lebanon which had this to say about Lebanon‘s Gini Coefficient: 
...it  is important  to  note  that  the  Estimated  Household  Income  Inequality  Dataset  
did  not  have  an observation  for Lebanon. Gates (1998, p. 143), however, documents a 
Gini coefficient of 53.7 for 1960. For the year 1997, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (online) lists Lebanon with a Gini coefficient of 56. We therefore assumed 
for Lebanon a value of 53 for all observations, which is probably a rather conservative 
estimate.
137
 
The paper concludes that ―Lebanon is extremely unequal relative to its democratic and 
economic development level and that this inequality has substantial power in  explaining  
armed  conflict.‖138 
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Figure 5: The Risk of Civil War in Democracies and Nondemocracies at Different 
Levels of Income 
 
Source: Collier et al. (2003, p.65) 
 
 
Another indicator of regional inequality is income levels per region. I was able to 
get income levels for 1957, though eighteen years before the 1975-1990 conflict, they 
give an idea of the disparity between the regions. Per capita income in Beirut was US 
$803; in the Mountains, the North and Biqa‘ around US $200, and in the South US 
$151.
139
 Having an income disparity of 400-500% along sectarian lines in a highly 
politicized country smaller than Connecticut makes Lebanon an opportunity not to be 
missed by any capable and willing za’im. Communal za’ims were eager to point out this 
income disparity along sectarian lines, blame the government for it, and promise their 
constituencies with more favorable government spending if only the people would 
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maintain their undivided loyalties. Most of this was due to the rapid transformation of the 
economy from a rural/agriculture based to a service based economy.
140
  
―By 1966 less than one-third (28%) of the labor force was engaged in the services 
sector which generated 68% of the GNP. In other words, two-thirds of the labor force 
must struggle for only one-third of the national income…Over the last two decades [late 
1950s to late 1970s] growth has taken place in Lebanon's economy, but not development 
of benefit to the whole population.‖141  
I would like to qualify my agreement with Muller, Hudson and Farson‘s 
conclusions since such income discrepancies do not always cause conflicts in other 
developing countries. I still believe, however, they were an important factor in Lebanon 
due to their uneven distribution. Income disparities were concentrated along sectarian 
lines in Lebanon, where everyone is aware of the patronage system and government 
corruption. So it was much easier to raise sentiments of disenfranchisement among a 
particular sect. Confessionalism makes it easier to channel any economic grievances 
along sectarian lines especially if communities were "encouraged to do so by their 
political leaders."
142
 The Lebanese people‘s attitude toward their government was a 
reflection of their standards of living. If a region‘s economic performance suffered, they 
simply blamed it on the government which is led by another sect. This is exactly what 
happened among the Shias and led to the rise of the Mahronmeen (Deprived) Movement 
which later spurred the current Amal Movement. Shia politicians were successful in 
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convincing their coreligionists that the root of their destitute resided in their unfair 
treatment by the government in Beirut.  
 In a study on the political positions of Lebanese students in the 1970s, Halim 
Barakat discovers a deeply politicized society. The overall socioeconomic position of the 
religious community to which students belonged was more indicative of the political and 
economic identification of a student than his/her immediate socioeconomic position. A 
rich Muslim student – whose community lagged economically - was more prone to 
identify with leftist ideologies than a Christian poor student – whose community fared 
better socioeconomically.
143
   
 
3.7 CONFLICT NEIGHBORS: CONFLICT SPILLOVER 
In addition to its disintegrated society and sectarian politics, Lebanon‘s neighbors 
were in conflict. After ―sectarian dominance,‖ the Arab-Israeli conflict is probably the 
second most important cause of conflict or at least the escalation of the civil war to 
uncontrollable violence. Lebanon has ―bad neighbors‖ indeed.  
 Lebanon received the first influx of Palestinian migrants in 1948 after the first 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The second wave arrived after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 
third major one in 1970, after ―Black September‖ when the PLO was kicked out of 
Jordan. As of Dec 31
st
 2006, according to UNRWA, 408,438 Palestinian refugees live in 
12 camps in Lebanon.
144
 This is not the entire number of Palestinians as many well-off 
Palestinians would not be registered with UNRWA. Still, the lower estimate of 408,438 
makes for ten percent of the Lebanese population, thus their impact on Lebanon‘s politics 
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is significant. Lebanon did not have to contend with hosting a large immigrant influx but 
with an armed, actively fighting group that many times challenged the Lebanese 
government. Palestinians were using Lebanon as a staging ground to launch attacks 
against Israel. This led to several Israeli invasions in retaliation for Palestinian guerilla 
activities that caused the most damage to the country in human costs and destroyed 
infrastructure. Internally, it caused divisions between Muslims and Christians in their 
support for the Palestinians and their activities against Israel. Muslims in general and 
leftist organizations were sympathetic to the right of Palestinians to a war of liberation, 
whereas the Maronites saw the Palestinians as a threat to Lebanon‘s sovereignty and did 
not want to sacrifice their country for a Muslim-Arab cause.  Increased Palestinian armed 
presence radicalized the underprivileged Muslims, mostly Shia migrants to Beirut from 
the South.  This radicalization was considered by the Maronites a threat to the political 
system that had favored their ilk.
145
 The Shias felt that they paid the highest price since 
they were predominantly in South Lebanon before the civil war, the area that bore the 
brunt of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the 1982 invasion, when Beirut was the site 
of the heaviest destruction. Continuous Israeli reconnaissance and sonic booms over 
Beirut and other Lebanese cities remind the Lebanese that they are not safe from the 
Israeli reach and this affects people‘s perceptions about safety and stability, which 
decreased Lebanon‘s attractiveness as an investment and tourist destination.  
 
Israeli-Syrian Conflict  
After Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 war, it increased its 
involvement in Lebanese politics. Lebanon became even more important to its national 
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security strategies. Unable to launch a successful conventional war against Israel, it 
armed and supported proxy forces in South Lebanon to fight its battles on Lebanese lands. 
Again, Lebanon bore the cost while Syria reaped the political dividends. Syria was also 
worried about the rise of the pro-Israeli Phalangists so at times it intervened directly in 
the Lebanese war against them. Ironically, at other times when the LNM almost defeated 
the Christians, Syria interfered to protect the Maronites to avoid having one dominant 
faction that would eventually stand up to Syrian influence in Lebanon. So having warring 
factions with no absolute military advantage worked well for the Syrians who could be 
called upon as intermediaries by the loosing party for support.  
 
External Intervention 
The Lebanese war was not isolated from the geopolitics of its time. This was at 
the height of the Cold War, the rise of Iranian influence who supported the Shias in 
Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam supported the Christian Army Leader, Aoun, to 
balance Iranian influence. The Saudis and traditional Gulf States funded Christian parties 
to offset the rise of Nasserite support among Lebanese Muslims. The Americans came to 
the rescue of the Christian and pro-Western presidents on more than one occasion with 
military intervention, as did the French. The list goes on and continues today. Lebanese 
divided loyalties facilitated external interventions. Several times, Lebanese militias 
actively sought funding and weaponry from whomever would provide them in exchange 
for short-lived loyalties. While many Lebanese blame external world powers for their 
miseries, the truth is that their eagerness to accept external intervention made meddling in 
Lebanon‘s internal affairs the norm, to the extent that choosing the next president ceased 
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to be a Lebanese affair and the new norm was for external powers to agree among 
themselves and give a name to the parliament to elect. The same impasse was repeated in 
2007 after the end of the last Lebanese president‘s term. The country remained without a 
president till May 2008, when the Lebanese parties signed an agreement in Doha, Qatar 
with Saudi and Syrian blessing.
146
  
 
3.8 DOING BUSINESS 
There are no rankings for doing business in Lebanon for the years preceding the 
Lebanese civil war (1975-1990); however, one can use the Doing Business results 
published by The World Bank Group for 2008 to assess business conditions prior to the 
civil war (see Table 2). One can argue that the environment for doing business in 2008 is 
more conducive than those prevailing in the post-Independence and pre-civil war period 
since the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri liberalized the economy and introduced many 
reforms after the conflict ended during the 1990s. To be conservative one can assume it 
was not any worse in 2008 than the during pre-civil war era.  
Overall Lebanon ranks 85 out of a total 178 countries for the Ease of Doing 
Business. This seems like an average ranking, but the country is 132 for Starting a 
Business, 113 for Dealing with Licenses, 121 for Enforcing Contracts, and 117 for 
Closing a Business. Lebanon is practically shooting itself in the foot. In effect, the 
country could achieve far greater prosperity by greatly liberalizing the legal, regulatory 
and bureaucratic practices that constrain individuals from realizing their potential.  
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The country has free market policies on paper but the problem is bureaucracy and 
implementing these laws efficiently with minimal government involvement. If the 
environment to do business were more favorable, one would expect less rent seeking and 
a higher growth rate and more economic opportunities for the various Lebanese groups to 
profit from instead of resorting to violence in counterproductive attempts to achieve 
better standards of living at the cost of destroying each other and the country. 
Table 2: Lebanon’s ranking in Doing Business 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Doing Business 2008 Lebanon: A Project Benchmarking the Regulatory Cost of Doing Business in 
178 Economies, World Bank Group, Accessed on 3/20/2008 at http://www.doingbusiness.org  
 
3.9 GOVERNANCE 
Similar to inferring from the recent Doing Business rankings, I will use the range 
of the 1996-2006 Worldwide Governance Indicators to form an assessment of the 
governance situation in Lebanon during the pre-war period. Again, the assumption that 
the situation is not any worse today is feasible since the country has had over 15 years of 
post-conflict peace and development, significant government reforms in the 1990s and 
implementation of the Ta‘if agreement. All indicators range between the 25th and 50th 
54 
 
percentile and recently the Political Stability indicator dipped far below the 25
th
 
percentile (see Figure 6). According to the booklet issued by The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development on measuring governance, ―[r]esearchers estimate that 
when governance is improved by one standard deviation, incomes rise about three-fold in 
the long run.‖ 147 The results show that there is plenty of room for improvement for 
governance in Lebanon. 
So another cause of repeated conflicts is the lack of ―good governance‖ which 
would have precipitated lower growth than possible with better governance. Moreover, 
the low ranking for Voice and Accountability, ―the extent to which a country‘s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media,‖148 is a reasonable explanation of why so many 
Lebanese resort to violence, rightly or wrongly, since the available system would not be 
capable of addressing their concerns. Lebanon has achieved low-middle to middle per 
capita income level; so an ineffective or partial democracy is no longer acceptable to the 
public and increases the risk of conflict.
149
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147
 ―A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance Matters 2007 Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 1996–2006,‖ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 
2007;  accessed on 3/20/2010 at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/wbi2007-report.pdf  
148
 Ibid.  
149
 Collier et al. (2003), 64.  
55 
 
Figure 6: Lebanon’s Governance Indicators 1996, 2002, 2006 
 
Figure 3; Downloaded from the Governance Matters 2007 website on 3/20/2008; 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp#  
 
3.10 ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
According to the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, Lebanon ranks 73
rd
 out of 
157 countries, ―the economy is 60.9% free‖ and can be described as ―moderately free.‖ 
Like many other indicators this is an average ranking. A closer look reveals serious 
problems for conducting business and obstructions to economic freedom. Investment is 
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only 30% free. The laws are liberal with few restrictions, ―but red tape and corruption, 
arbitrary licensing decisions, archaic legislation, and an ineffectual judicial system are 
serious impediments, as are ongoing violence and the threat of war.‖ Property Rights are 
30% free due to weak enforcement; ―The judiciary is significantly influenced by the 
security services and the police.‖ Freedom from Corruption is 36% free due to rampant 
corruption in the public sector; ―The public sector remains corrupt, especially in 
procurement, public works, taxation, and real estate registration.‖150    
These constraints result in economic inefficiencies, lower incomes, higher costs to 
the consumer and lower growth rates than the country‘s potential. While not a direct 
cause since the country has relatively free policies when it comes to Trade, Fiscal and 
Financial Freedoms (See Figure 7) the high level of corruption in the public sector and 
the personal gains that result for those in power makes conflict attractive for those 
seeking a share of the rents created by policy-induced price distortions and corruption. 
It is worth noting that almost all of the present government leaders with the 
exception of the Prime Minister were militia leaders or involved with militia activities 
during the civil war and continue the same practices that were present before the civil war: 
patronage politics, corruption, and government intervention in the judiciary.  
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Figure 7: Lebanon’s Ten Economic Freedoms 
 
Source: Holmes, Feulner, and Mary Anastasia O‘Grady. ―2008 Index of Economic Freedom;‖ The Heritage 
Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc.; 2008, accessed on 5/6/2008 at www.heritage.org/index  
 
3.11 INCOME AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Based on IMF data from the World Economic Outlook Database, Lebanon had 
high rates of real growth before the 1975 war years. There was a slowdown after the high 
growth rates of the early seventies, but the economy still registered high positive growth 
rates during 1970-1974 (see Figure 8). The slowdown in growth was due to the 1973 war, 
oil price shock and geopolitical uncertainties in the region.  Given the high rates of 
economic growth until 1974, one evidently must search elsewhere for the causes of the 
protracted civil war that broke out in 1975. One candidate is the highly politicized 
economy, which spawned and deepened internal tensions and political gridlocks. There 
were some symptoms of a slowing economy in general due to Arab oil money bypassing 
the Lebanese banking system in favor of European and American banks. Also, the role of 
Lebanon as a transit country for goods was diminishing as other Arab countries were 
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building up their own ports and roads. For example, ―the volume of transactions on the 
Beirut stock exchange have declined drastically and progressively: from L.L. [Lebanese 
Pounds] 28.9 m in 1965 to L.L. 4.7 m in 1968. Capital investments in corporations 
declined from L.L. 304 millions in 1965 to L.L. 170 millions in 1966, L.L. 120 millions 
in 1967 and L.L. 49 millions in 1968.‖ 151  The most immediate economic problem, 
however, was inflation. ―In 1973, the rise in the cost of consumer goods ranged between 
24% and 29%.‖152 While the economy was still growing until the civil war year, an 
uncertain economic future and capital flight compounded with inflation might have made 
Lebanon more conflict prone.   
Figure 8: Growth Rates 1970-1974 
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Source: Author.  
Data Source: IMF, The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003 
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I also checked income levels, per capita GNP, for an earlier period. There was a 
period of stagnation in the 1950s and that could have been a factor in bringing about the 
1958 civil war ―but subsequently, between 1958 and 1972, per capita real GNP grew at 
an average annual rate of 3.5 percent.‖153 This is a very rapid rate of growth. There was a 
dip starting in 1956 due to the Suez Crisis and the 1958 civil war which was far less 
destructive than the 1975-1990 civil war. After the 1958 war, the economy started 
recovering immediately but the per capita income took ten years to go back to the 1955 
levels; this is a testimony to the enduring cost of conflict (to be discussed further later in 
this paper). 
The consistent growth for over 15 years before the civil war shows that growth is 
not a cause of the Lebanese civil war. Income levels were higher than other countries in 
the region that did not have civil wars in the same period like Syria and Jordan; though 
these countries did show higher levels of average growth (see Figure 9). The optimism 
that higher growth brings could have been a factor in these countries averting conflict. 
Still overall, there is no evidence that the country‘s economic growth or the level of per 
capita income are causes of the 1975 conflict.  
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Figure 9: Per Capita GNP in 1976 Dollars and its Average Growth during 1950-
1972 
 
Source: Barlow (1982). Percentages on right-hand side are the average annual rate of increase for 1950-
1972. 
 
3.12 MILITARY SPENDING 
As a percentage of GDP, military spending was not high by the region‘s standard, 
2.6% of GDP before the war in 1971.
154
 So it‘s hard to consider military spending as a 
cause of war. In fact, one can hypothetically argue that a stronger national army, hence 
higher military spending, might have discouraged conflict or controlled the Palestinians 
and other militias but this is hard to prove empirically. I contend that even with a larger 
military and security apparatus, in a country like Lebanon, where the soldiers are deeply 
divided along sectarian lines, the army would still have split like it did several times in 
1976 and in the 1980s. I believe that would have aggravated the situation further; the 
country would have only gained two additional well-armed parties to the conflict (i.e. the 
factions of a split army). 
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3.13 DIASPORA 
Lebanon has a very large diaspora ranging from a conservatively estimated five 
million to an inflated estimate of 15 million.  Even at low end of the estimates the total 
exceeds Lebanon‘s domestic population, and has higher levels of income than the 
locals.
155
 As Collier et. al. (2003, 85) explains, this large diaspora almost doubled the risk 
of civil war in Lebanon. Most of the migrants were skilled labor or successful 
entrepreneurs and many became famous and multi-millionaires. There are big Lebanese 
concentrations of Sunnis in Australia, Maronites in Western countries and Shias in Africa. 
Usually those who leave the country tend to become more hard-line than those living in 
the home country. One reason could be that they are detached from the daily 
repercussions of extreme ideologies and have the means to support extremists. The 
massive remittances of the Lebanese, estimated at US$ 1.5-2.5 billion,
156
 were an 
important source of revenue for the militias and helped subsidize their activities. Because 
the militias controlled the banks, the land and business opportunities in their domains to 
the exclusion of the State, some Lebanese expatriates were partners with militia leaders 
and zu’amas in profitable legal and illegal activities like arms smuggling, drug 
production and distribution.
157
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3.14 RENTS AND AID MONEY 
Lebanon has been a recipient of foreign aid for decades. The country has had 
donors from Western as well as Arab countries. During the sixties and seventies, 
Lebanon received donations to help the regions most affected by the Israeli attacks, yet 
there were always scandals regarding allocations of aid money. One 1974 MERIP 
commented on the government‘s relief plan to aid southerners hurt by Israeli attacks, 
―…even in respect to this plan, scandals abound in the mass media as the feudal and 
semi-feudal zu'ama direct such government funds (in part received from Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and other oil states) to their own clients, allies and kinspeople, who are getting 
wealthier in the process.‖158  
As more parties engage in rent-seeking activities in Lebanon – ruling elite and 
their cronies more successfully than others –  
the social losses inflicted by rent-seeking steadily mount, while the rest of society 
transfers an ever growing proportion of their real incomes to the beneficiaries of these 
subsidies. Increasingly, society will fragment into divisions by narrow interests, each 
seeking to garner subsidies from everyone else. Such is the recipe for a slow growth, 
conflictual society.
159
  
This scenario very much reflects the state of the Lebanese economy before and during the 
1975-1990 civil war. 
Hence, the element of rent-seeking in the economy, especially the private 
appropriation and misallocation of foreign aid and government spending, increased the 
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risk of a civil war by hampering potential higher growth rates as well as making the state 
an attractive resource to capture for private use.  
 
3.15 DIVERGENT NATIONAL IDENTITIES  
 I would like to add one major cause of the Lebanese civil war not covered by 
Collier‘s list of potential causes of conflict: divergent national identities. At the creation 
of Greater Lebanon, the Lebanese communities held very different national identities.  
The Maronites saw Lebanon as an independent Christian nation with a western 
outlook. For them Lebanon was the eastern most limit of the Christian Mediterranean. 
They had a long history of autonomy in Mount Lebanon, an established religious, cultural 
and commercial relationship with Europe and the New World. This Christian entity was 
to be defended at any cost.
160
 The Muslims, the Sunnis more than others, saw themselves 
as Ottoman citizens, part of a much larger Muslim nation. With the rise of Arab 
nationalism, their aim was unity with the larger Arab world or at least unity within a 
Greater Syria where they would be part of the ruling majority, Sunni Muslims. The 
Druzes always considered themselves Arabs and held pan-Arab aspirations as long as 
their community‘s interests were respected and protected in Mount Lebanon.161  
 The construction of Greater Lebanon brought with it the Sunni community which 
historically espoused the Ottoman political culture – very different from the Maronite 
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mountain culture.
162
 For the Muslims, Lebanon‘s sovereignty could be compromised or 
even sacrificed for a larger pan-Arab nation. This fact gains greater importance as the 
center of gravity, economically and demographically, shifts to Beirut and the other 
coastal cities with a Sunni majority in the second half of the twentieth century.
163
 
 Hourani supports the view that the highly politicized Lebanese never had a 
common identity or a uniting ideology, leaving them exposed to external meddling:  
The mass of unconcerned private citizens, living remote from political life, which 
makes the stability of larger states, scarcely existed. A small, weak country, lying 
in an important position, cannot prevent its internal conflicts becoming the 
channels through which great powers win influence and pursue their own 
rivalries; by its position and the nature of its population, Lebanon lay open to 
waves of influence from America, from western Europe, and from the Arab 
world lying all around.
164 
 I include ―bad neighbors‖ or ―conflict spillover‖ as a major cause of conflict in 
Lebanon, but the country‘s lack of a unifying ideology made it much easier for external 
factors to influence internal politics. Rabinovich cites this lack of a uniting ideology as 
the Achilles‘ heel of Lebanon: "the independent Lebanese republic appears to be artificial 
and archaic, built on shaky demographic and political foundations, and therefore doomed 
to be destroyed by the domestic and external foes of its political system."
165
  
For Rabinovich, the country did not fulfill the requirements of a nation state but 
was a patchwork at best and the country‘s zaims knew that: ―The Lebanese polity was not 
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based on the presumed existence of a Lebanese nation but on a confederation of 
protonational communities, each of which claimed the ultimate allegiance of its 
members.‖166 It is for this reason that the presence of the Palestinians was so divisive and 
destructive in Lebanon whereas it was handled effectively in all other Arab states. The 
identity differences between the Christians and the Muslims exacerbated their attitudes 
towards the Palestinian activities. The Muslims saw it as a sacred duty to be supportive of 
the PLO; whereas, the Christians saw the PLO‘s presence as an abuse of Lebanese 
sovereignty and security.
167
 
 In Figure 10, I represent the gap in the national identities of the Lebanese 
Christians and Muslims. Obviously, this is a broad generalization, but I believe it 
illustrates the issue at hand. While other societies start with a common identity base (i.e. 
Arabic, European, Muslim, Christian, African, Western, Asian, etc…), the different 
Lebanese communities build their identities on two different supranational affiliations. 
Hence the Lebanese republic had to contend with two different national identity pyramids.  
Moreover, Johnson believes that if the Lebanese did not have a shared national outlook, 
the confessional system did not help create one. A Lebanese society structured around 
confessional representation in every aspect of life (politics, military, education, 
commerce and social services) would find its ―prospects for a national identification are 
reduced.‖168 That is why, 60 years after its creation, the Lebanese are still divided about 
their country‘s national outlook.  
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Figure 10: Lebanese Identity Pyramids 
 
Source: Author 
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3.16 CAUSES SUMMARY  
 
The Lebanese civil war was the result of both internal and external factors. This is 
not restricted to the last civil war; it has recurred since the days of Ottoman rule: 
The three civil wars which Lebanon has experienced during the last two centuries 
– in 1860, 1958 and the…[1975-1990] one…– seem to have two main features in 
common. First, all three wars have involved an awakening of dormant religious 
sectarian tensions, which grew on every occasion to overshadow other expressed 
or implied sources and causes of conflict. Second, all three wars have been either 
initiated by regional or foreign powers to serve their own interests, or else used in 
one way or another for such ends.
169
  
 In addition to the classical causes identified by political scientists, like foreign 
interference, there are several other factors that increased the risk of a civil war in 
Lebanon and fall closely in line with the factors Collier identifies as major causes of 
conflict: sectarian dominance, ―bad‖ neighbors, a large diaspora, and bad governance. A 
low ranking of ease of doing business, a low rating on economic freedom and a highly 
politicized economy add to these risks making the country‘s repeated conflicts more 
probable. See Table 3 for a summary of all the causes of war. To these I add one critical 
factor that combined with the others identified by Collier sealed Lebanon‘s fate: 
divergent national identities.   
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Table 3: A summary of the causes of the Lebanese civil war 
Potential Cause of War Y/N
Geography and Natural Resources NO
History of Civil Wars YES
Sectarian Dominance YES
Government Corruption YES
Too Many Parties to Please YES
Uneven Development & Income Inequality YES
Conflict Neighbors: Conflict Spill Over YES
Doing Business YES
Governance YES
Economic Freedom YES
Income and Economic Growth NO
Military Spending NO
Diaspora YES
Rents and Aid Money YES
Divergent National Identities YES
 
Source : Author.  
A ―YES‖ means that the potential cause increased the risk of war in Lebanon, a ―NO‖ means it 
was not a conflict risk factor. This table does not reflect the magnitude of the risk factor. 
 
69 
 
Chapter 4: Costs of War 
 
To assess the costs of the Lebanese civil war, I will follow the same structure used 
for assessing the causes of war. I will assess different costs of conflict individually to 
avoid confusion. There is no doubt that the impact of the costs of war on the population is 
compounded when experienced collectively, but it will be hard to reflect that in this paper. 
I also want to acknowledge that the grouping of the costs of war is inspired by three 
books of Collier.
170
 
 
4.1 HUMAN COST 
The Lebanese civil war is infamous for its ferocity and urban guerrilla fighting 
that in many news articles or movies when someone wants to describe how bad a conflict 
is they would compare it to Beirut. We can get an idea of the human toll if we just 
measure the war in human deaths compared to the country‘s small population. Several 
sources cite the figure of 150,000 people killed in the civil war, and that‘s the figure most 
used in Lebanon.
171
 Edgar O‘Ballance has a good section on the cost of the Lebanese 
War; he estimates about 150,000 to 200,000 perished during the war and 20,000 to 
30,000 were kidnapped from a war population of 2.2 to 2.4 million.
172
 This means that 
there was one death or injury for every ten people. There is hardly anyone in Lebanon 
who did not loose a relative during the civil war. In addition there are tens of thousands 
of ―disappeared‖ people: no one knows what happened to them or ever recovered their 
bodies. 
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It is hard to elaborate on the human tragedy of growing up and living through a 15 
year brutal civil war. I hope the numbers above and other costs below describe some of 
that. Yet I doubt that one can ever capture in writing every individual suffering and 
human trauma experienced during such a war.  
 
4.2 WEAK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Another result of the civil war was the virtual collapse of the central government. 
The Lebanese government became a shell of its former self with nominal authority in 
parts of Beirut. Lebanon was divided into different cantons under the control of various 
warring factions.
173
 The resulting vacuum was exploited by militias and Palestinian 
fighters (PLO). The freedom to operate in Lebanon emboldened the PLO to launch more 
daring attacks on Israel and the result was devastating Israeli retaliations that did little to 
disrupt the PLO before the 1982 Israeli Invasion while destroying Lebanon‘s 
infrastructure and its economy.
174
 The most significant invasions were in 1978 and 1982. 
In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon, clearing out Palestinian strongholds as far north as the 
Litani River and establishing the renegade South Lebanese Army in South Lebanon. The 
1982 Israeli invasion, which affected the entire southern half of Lebanon as far north as 
Beirut, was the most traumatic of the fifteen year war in casualties and economic ruin. 
Israel occupied the country south of the Litani river (about 10% of Lebanon) until 2000. 
The 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of South Lebanon led to the formation of 
Hizbollah, which became the strongest militia in the country and is today the only party 
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with arms other than the Lebanese army, strong enough to block presidential elections 
even though the government has a parliamentary majority.
175
  
After the Shia saw their homeland, the South, overtaken by the Israelis with 
minimal resistance from the Lebanese Army, they were bent on forming their own 
defense apparatus. So a militant group splintered off Amal, the Shia movement with 
social welfare goals and took on increasingly Islamic Revolutionary tones (borrowing 
from the Iranian Islamic Revolution). With Syria‘s acquiescence, Hizbollah fighters were 
trained, armed and funded by the Iranians. Their status and capability kept growing to 
become by 2008 the kingmakers of Lebanese policy, as long as they met with Syria‘s 
ambitions. In other words, had Israel not invaded Lebanon, Hizbollah would not have 
come into existence. This shows how a civil war can end but its consequences remain far 
longer and how the Israeli action that was supposed to quell the Palestinian threat created 
a more perilous adversary.  
 In addition, the Lebanese government lost its independence to Syrian hegemony. 
With 30,000 soldiers stationed in Lebanon, Syria held a veto over presidential selections 
and total control over the country‘s foreign policy – Lebanon was not allowed to 
negotiate with Israel unilaterally. The Syrians oversaw selective implementation of 
justice. For example, they imprisoned Samir Gaaga, leader of the Maronite Lebanese 
Forces, for crimes during the war; whereas, they allowed other warlords to keep 
prominent positions in the government as long as they played by Syria‘s rules. Anti-
Syrian politicians or members of the clergy were often assassinated or sent into exile. 
Syria again violated Lebanon‘s sovereignty by allowing some 2000 Iranian 
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Revolutionary Guards to operate in the Biqa' and train Shiite groups, Hizbullah being the 
most prominent of them. Hizbullah members were allowed to keep their weapons, the 
only exception to the post-civil war disarmament policy. President Assad was determined 
to keep a strong bargaining chip with Israel for negotiations over the Golan Heights.
176
  
 
4.3 INTERNATIONLIZATION OF THE CONFLICT 
The many factions of the Lebanese civil war often sought funding and support 
from more powerful external parties. This internationalized the conflict, and the result 
was a more complicated conflict with more parties affected, reducing peace prospects and 
lengthening the conflict. At some time or another, there were Palestinian, Israeli, Syrian, 
Iranian, American, French, British, Italian, and other Arab fighters on Lebanese soil. 
These were in addition to the myriad clandestine operations as Lebanon became an open 
arena for intelligence operations and regional politics.  
 
4.4 GDP AND WELFARE FORGONE 
Several sources show that the fifteen year civil war almost halved Lebanon‘s 
economy. ―Estimates in 1985 ranged from L£30 billion to L£43.8 billion; in either case, 
in real terms GDP [was] no more than half 1974 level. Inflation in 1987 [was] estimated 
at more than 700 percent, and unemployment estimated at 35 percent.‖ 177  The 
International Monetary Fund ―estimates that real gross domestic product in Lebanon 
dropped from LL 8.1 million in 1974 to LL 4.1 million in 1993.‖178  
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Due to the capital intensive government rebuilding efforts total public debt rose 
from 58.6% of GDP in 2000 to 103.9% in 2006.
179
  
 I performed a counterfactual analysis to indicate the likely evolution of the 
Lebanese economy had the civil war never occurred. I choose the year 1969 as a base 
year with a 100 index to represent real GDP for that year. Based on IMF data, I took the 
average annual percent change of real GDP for all Developing and Transition Countries 
(some 147 countries) and applied it as the rate of change to the Lebanese economy had 
the war never happened. For the pre-war period, the Lebanese growth rate was actually 
higher than the selected group, so there is no overestimation of the welfare cost of the 
civil war, as measured by output and income forgone. As Figure 11 shows, at the end of 
the war, Lebanese real GDP was less than 50% of 1969‘s and less than a third of what it 
was the year before the war. Even 14 years after the end of the war, GDP is still less than 
1969 GDP and 60% of the pre-war level. This shows how punishing a war can be and 
how long the cost of war persists. Had the war never happened, Lebanon could have had 
a real GDP over three times the 1969 level. This is an irreplaceable loss in welfare. While 
most of the developing world was growing, Lebanon was struggling to recover from 
fifteen years of war.  
Salim Nasr points to another disruptive phenomenon during the war years, the 
forced redistribution of wealth: ―The political-military up-heavals (sic) of 1975-76 and 
the following years were accompanied by all kinds of extortion exerted by the newly-
formed and locally dominant armed factions, groups and gangs: pillage, seizure, 
                                                 
179
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occupation, forced taxation, smuggling and other forms of forced transfer 
proliferated.‖180 
Figure 11: Cost of War – Lebanese GDP Forever Lost (Base Year 1969) 
Cost of War - Lebanese GDP Forever Lost (Base Year 1969)
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Source: Author 
Data Source:  IMF, The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003 
 
This was happening at the same time that the official economy was shrinking, 
with militias even controlling traditionally government functions like the sea port and 
customs. Custom revenues collected as a percentage of expected revenues decreased from 
97% in 1980 to a miniscule 10% in 1986.
181
 The confiscated state revenues benefitted the 
militias‘ destructive activities as well as their accumulation of wealth.  
Becoming a failed state, Lebanon started attracting illegal activities and became a 
safe haven for arms smuggling, money laundering and drug production. For example, the 
                                                 
180
 Nasr, Salim. ―Lebanon's War: Is the End in Sight?,‖ Middle East Report, No. 162, Lebanon's War, Jan- 
Feb 1990, pp. 4-8+30.  
181
 Ibid. 
75 
 
value of opium and hashish production reached an estimated US$1 billion in 1987, 
equivalent to one-third of the Lebanese GDP at the time. An inefficient, corrupt and war-
depressed economy affected the labor market: ―the rate of unemployment [rose] from 5.4 
in 1980 to 35 percent in 1989.‖182   
 
4.5 INCREASED MILITARY SPENDING 
Military spending increased dramatically due to the civil war – a common 
reaction of governments in civil war countries. It rose from 2.6% of GDP before the war 
(1971) to 6.6% in 1979 and to a high of 9.0% in 1985. Lebanon‘s 1971 GDP was only 
about 11% higher than that of 1985, so the increase in military spending was drastic. 
Ironically military spending increased to its highest level when the country needed 
development spending most. Military spending did not fall to prewar levels after war but 
remained high at 4.4% of GDP in 1994.
183
 
 
4.6 CURRENCY DEVALUATION AND HYPERINFLATION 
 Decreased state revenue, increased military spending in the 1980s, more state 
subsidies, government budget deficits financed by printing money and a ruined economy 
led to a run on the lira, the Lebanese Pound. One of the main costs of the prolonged 
Lebanese war was hyperinflation and the collapse of the national currency. Having had 
ten straight years of growth prior to the war and a balance of payments surplus of more 
than US$4 billion the currency was stable until the last years of the war, but a day of 
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reckoning was in the waiting. With the collapse of trust in the Lebanese Pound
184
 (LP), 
depletion of the reserves, and crossing the psychological barrier of LP 100 per US$ the 
currency went into free fall. The lira went from LP 2.32 per US$ on the eve of war to 
over LP 500 per US$ at the end of war, and kept falling in the early nineties before 
stabilizing at LP 1,500 per US$ (Figure 12). Many people lost their life savings and there 
were numerous stories of suicides and heart attacks at the news of the falling currency. 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the impact of this devaluation on the poorest through the 
loss of purchasing power of the minimum wage and also the rise of emigration as the 
currency deteriorated. 
 
Figure 12: Exchange Rate Before and After the Civil War (LP/USD) 
 
Source: Author. Data Source: Exchange rate, national currency per US$, period average, From IMF 
[code 6110] 
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Figure 13: Value of Legal Minimum Wage in USD (1981-1988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wenger and Denney (1990)  
 
Figure 14: Net Emigration out of Lebanon (1975-1989) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Wenger and Denney (1990)  
 
A main driver for many ailments of the economy is inflation. In Lebanon one can 
see the relationship between violence and inflation. As the war dragged on there were 
severe shortages of goods and in some cases there were manipulations of commodity 
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prices by monopolists who took advantage of the weak government. In the end 
government spending, budget deficits, inflationary currency issue and the collapse of the 
value of the currency led to high levels of inflation that became hyperinflation by the 
mid-eighties (see Figure 15).  
Figure 15: Inflation – Annual Percentage Change 
Source: Author 
Data source:  IMF, The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003 
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4.7 WAR ECONOMY: PROLONGED CIVIL WAR 
 Militias usually started as small local defense forces which later grew into 
organized professional military and self-sustaining business units. The area devoted to 
hashish production expanded from 60 hectares in 1984 to 3000 in 1988 under Syrian 
protection in the Biqa' valley, where no significant government presence was ever 
allowed. The Lebanese civil war cost several hundreds of millions of US dollars a year 
and drug trafficking was one source for financing it.
185
  
Even legal goods and services that were provided by the government became the 
domain of the militia or "escaped state monopoly" as early as 1976. Militia groups were 
importing crude oil without license early on in the war. When two oil refineries were 
destroyed by Christian militias, the government minister decided that they could not be 
salvaged; the militias were ready to fulfill the demand. Even after the war ended, the 
government only licensed private oil terminals to six companies all linked to ex-militia 
groups.
186
 
There was ample evidence of ideological and sectarian resentment before the start 
of the war; however, that alone could not explain the extent of ethnic cleansing and the 
consolidation of territorial gains by militias. As different militias carved out small 
enclaves and controlled the main transport routes, checkpoint ―taxes‖ along the main 
corridors generated a significant source of revenue for the militias and financed their 
future violent ventures.
187
 
 Once started the Lebanese Civil War was hard to contain. A war economy once 
developed was self-sustaining. Drug money, smuggling, prostitution, protection rackets, 
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militia ―taxes‖ 188  and money laundering all gave warlords and other war profiteers 
considerable power that often rivaled or surpassed the State‘s. At times the militias 
gained enough economic power that they could buy arms in the black market freeing 
them from their external patrons. With the decline in the authority of the za’ims and the 
rise of the war economy, it was hard to put an end to the war using internal mechanisms. 
Only strong external intervention could have controlled such a conflict, but the 
international consensus did not come until 1990 when the interests of the regional and 
global powers aligned in the First Gulf War.
189
 The war economy sustained the violent 
activities of the warring factions, thus prolonging the suffering of the Lebanese civilians 
for 15 years.  
 
4.8 IMMIGRATION: BRAIN DRAIN 
Brain drain and massive immigration represents a cost of war with long lasting 
effects. ―With the city destroyed, many of Lebanon's highly skilled professionals left to 
work in other countries.‖ There is no accurate data for the number of people leaving the 
country during the 1975-1990 period, but estimates range from 500,000 to 990,000.
190
 
For a country of four million this is a heavy toll especially during the post-war period 
when skilled labor is much needed to rebuild the country. They did not just take with 
them their skills, they were usually better off than the average Lebanese and took with 
them an estimated US$10 billion in capital.
191
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―Beirut lost its preeminence as interpreter between Europe and the Middle 
East.‖192 The country relied on its location and banking sector to attract transit activity 
between the oil rich Arab countries and Europe. During the civil war several other 
countries took its place with better infrastructure and more stable environments (i.e. 
Cyprus, Qatar, and UAE). Tourism deteriorated to almost negligible levels and the only 
―tourists‖ were the Lebanese expatriates. The result is that Beirut faced an uphill battle to 
make up for the 15 years it lost during the civil war and the continuous development of 
its rivals. The situation remains unpredictable and so investors are unwilling to risk the 
funds needed to propel the country forward. ―The Council for Development and 
Reconstruction reported hesitancy among investors, including Lebanese natives, to return 
while regional political problems remain unsettled. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese 
left during the war, but only 55,000 had returned by 1991, an estimated 6 percent of the 
total.‖193 
 
4.9 PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS 
 The fifteen year Lebanese civil war had negative psychological effects and 
resulted in higher morbidity rates in the overall population, especially in West Beirut 
which saw the heaviest and most inhuman urban warfare. A study conducted at the 
American University of Beirut in collaboration with the University of Michigan 
concluded that  
the level of perceived negative impact of war-related events was found to be 
strongly associated with higher levels of depressive symptomatology among 
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mothers…the level of a mother‘s depressive symptomatology was found to be 
the best predictor of her child‘s reported morbidity, with higher levels of 
symptoms associated with higher levels of morbidity.
194
  
This is just one type of the social and psychological effects of the Lebanese civil war. 
Increased domestic violence, crime rates due to breakdown of social values, and 
deteriorating security infrastructure are other examples of the social costs of the Lebanese 
civil war.  
 
4.10 INTERNAL MIGRATION 
The rural migration to the main cities had started before the 1975 civil war, yet 
there is evidence that the major waves of internal migration, especially from the South, 
were due to violence (mainly Palestinian-Israeli clashes in the South). One also has to 
recall that the pre-1975 migrations from the South to Beirut were also due to the violent 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the South in the 1960s and 1970s. Also as the civil war 
started, the already undeveloped South received less government attention due to 
decreased resources and their diversion to resolve political and security issues. The rural 
population was halved from 1975 to 1990, adding more pressure to the so-called ―misery 
belt‖ around Beirut (see Figure 16).  
Yapp relates this internal migration to a major shift in Lebanese politics: ―The 
continuing civil war in Lebanon accelerated the decline of the traditional notable leaders, 
the za'ims.‖195 The za‘ims, mostly landowners, lost their rural base due to migration to 
the main cities. By 1980 almost three-quarters of the population was urban. The share of 
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the agriculture labor force declined from 38% of the total labor force in 1960 to 11% in 
1980. In a confessional system, where politics are based on consensus of the regional 
traditional leaders, ―the decline of the notables was associated with the decline of the 
state itself and the rise of new institutions independent of the state.‖196  
Notwithstanding that the za‘ama system had its own flaws which I discuss 
elsewhere, the traditional notables could sometimes be relied on to put a break on wanton 
violence. They were known to use sectarian strife as a bargaining chip to increase their 
share of the government‘s largesse but violence was measured and controlled. After the 
breakdown of the feudal system there was no structural alternative to contain or mediate 
social conflicts.
197
 The decline of the zaims saw some of the worst acts of violence 
perpetrated in the 1970s and 1980s in the history of Lebanon.
198
 Hence the civil war 
accelerated the urbanization of the population, which in turn led to the decline of the 
za‘ims‘ authority and consequently that of the state itself. 
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Figure 16: Urban and Rural Populations (Percent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Data Source: UN Population Division estimates and projections outlook (WEO) Database April 2003 
 
4.11 INCREASED MORTALITY RATES 
I analyzed the impact of the war on infant and child mortality rates. At first glance, 
mortality rates appear to have decreased in Lebanon, and that might be expected given 
the medical advancements that happened since the sixties and seventies. So it seems that 
the war had no impact on mortality rates, but if we compare mortality rates in Lebanon to 
those in the Middle East we can then see the impact of the war. Before the civil war 
Lebanon had the lowest mortality rates in the region. But after the war mortality rates 
became middle of the pack (see Figures 17 & 18). So all countries in the region improved 
their mortality rates at a much faster rate than Lebanon did and several overtook Lebanon 
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by the mid-eighties. So one can add the lives lost due to the slower improvement in 
mortality rates to the cost of the Lebanese Civil War.  
Figure 17: Mortality Rate Under Five  Mortality Rate Under Five
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Source: Author. 
Data Source: UNICEF estimates based on United Nations Population Division estimates, UN Demographic 
Yearbook data provided by countries, and country sources compiled by Unicef. From 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm 
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Figure 18: Infant Mortality Rate (0-1 yr) per 1,000 Live Births Infant Mortality Rate (0-1 yr) per 1000 live births
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Data Source: UNICEF estimates based on United Nations Population Division estimates, UN Demographic 
Yearbook data provided by countries, and country sources compiled by Unicef. From 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm 
 
 
4.12 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
While far from perfect, the prewar mixed society was a model in the Middle East 
and often called the ―Switzerland of the Middle East‖ for the relative diversity of the 
country compared to others in the region and its higher standards of living. But the civil 
war changed all this. There were many conflicts among the various factions. There were 
Christian-Muslim, Maronite-Maronite, Sunni-Shia, Sunni-Shia-Druz, Christian-Druz, and 
Shia-Shia clashes. This caused entrenched hatred in the society even in places where it 
did not previously exist. After the war, the country turned into a severely fractured and 
87 
 
divided society along sectarian lines. ―Muslims, who had made up 40 percent of the 1975 
population of "Christian" East Beirut, were just 5 percent of the 1989 population [of East 
Beirut]. A similar redistribution occurred in West Beirut, where the Christian population 
dropped from 35 percent of the total in 1975 to 5 percent in 1989.‖ 199  Faour‘s 
demographic study in 1988 also shows a segregated country after 13 years of war.
200
 The 
loss of whatever goodwill was left among the sects left a major scar on the society even 
after the end of the conflict. Beirut, a small city, had its own ―demarcation line‖ called 
the Green Line which divided Muslim from Christian neighborhoods (see Figure 19). 
This loss of social capital also caused a slow down in economic activity as half of the 
capital was isolated from its other half during the civil war. For an already small market, 
this created more costs and inefficiencies for both merchants and consumers.  
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Figure 19: Beirut a Divided City 
 
Source: Stewart (1996).  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The major causes that led to the Lebanese civil war are the confounding effects of 
sectarian dominance/polarization and a confessional system that did not adapt to the 
changing demographics; and external factors – like the Palestinian refugees,201 the Arab-
Israeli Conflict and inter-Arab conflicts that exacerbated the problem of divergent 
national identities.
202
 Yapp reaches a similar conclusion: 
Historians dispute whether the Lebanese civil war was the result of internal 
causes…or whether it was caused by an external factor…It is clear that it was 
both: there were disputes but the factor which made them so difficult to resolve 
peacefully was the presence of the Palestinians. On the other hand the Palestinian 
problem could have been solved without overmuch difficulty if the Lebanese 
polity had been united.
203
  
The main difference my conclusion has with Yapp‘s is the centrality of the divergent 
national identities; this is where my conclusion meets with Salibi‘s and Hourani‘s.  
The confessional system was not a cause of the war by itself; however, frozen in 
the National Pact, as a political system it was not able to withstand the demographic 
changes
204
 or external pressures.
205
 Roger Owen believes that because the confessional 
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system was based on the political consensus of a few traditional leaders, it eventually 
broke down when faced with untraditional pressures such as the "appearance of growing 
economic and social inequality...Palestinian militias...and repeated Israeli invasions."
206
 
Even though pan-Arabism was on the decline elsewhere by the 1970s, Lebanon was the 
only Arab country unable to prevent intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts from being 
fought on its territory.
207
 
Unlike many civil wars, no one sect completely lost in the Lebanese civil war; the 
war did not end with total capitulation of one faction. The warring parties met at the 
negotiating table in Ta‘if, Saudi Arabia. The war ended with the Maronites conceding a 
substantial portion of their power to Muslims and weakening the presidency in favor of 
the Sunni Prime Minister and the Shia Speaker of the Parliament. However, one has to 
wonder how long the Muslim community – over 60% of the population208 – will be 
content with 50% of the parliament seats without being able to run for the presidency. 
The Shias, the single largest sect,
209
 seeing their brethren gaining control in Iraq might 
not settle for the junior role anymore
210
 – see Figure 20 for a geographical distribution of 
religious groups after the 1975-1990 civil war.  
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Figure 20: The Geographical Distribution of Religious Groups, mid-1990s 
 
Source: Stewart (1996, 492). Data from Phares (1995) and Economist (1996).  
 
The causes that led to the 1975-1990 war remained in place after the end of the 
conflict.  In 1996, a history doctorate candidate observed,  
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Sectarianism – a creation that dates back no further than the beginnings of the 
modern era – reached a peak in Lebanon's 15-year civil war. While a discourse of 
national unity has emerged in the post-civil war period, Lebanon is again 
paralyzed by feuding among the elite and by the neglect of ordinary citizens, 
nearly a third of whom are living in poverty.
 211
  
 Even in 2010, twenty years after the war, most if not all of the causes of conflict 
mentioned above are still present. To mention a few: the governing system remains 
confessional and not representative of the population; the geopolitics of the region has 
not changed; freedom, governance and ease of doing business rankings are all low or at 
the bottom of the scale. External factors still threaten the stability of the country. There 
was a major war between Lebanon and Israel in June 2006.  
Lebanon dropped nearly 12 points in the [2007 Failed States] index, giving it a 
total score just a hair shy of Liberia‘s. The 2006 war in Lebanon reversed much 
of the progress made since the end of its own civil war in 1990. Israeli air strikes 
drove more than 700,000 Lebanese from their homes and did an estimated 
US$2.8 billion in damage to the country‘s infrastructure. A political crisis has the 
current government deadlocked and the country‘s economy remains weak.212 
The country might have weathered this blow in 2006 better if the root causes of the 
conflict had been addressed after the end of the civil war; ―…Lebanon was vulnerable 
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because its political and security structures lacked integrity and remained tensely divided 
by factionalized elites.‖213 
 In 2007, Lebanon entered a constitutional crisis that was actually rooted in 
domestic power struggles and regional geopolitics. Lebanon remained without a president 
from November 2007 to May 2008 because the different power factions could not agree 
on a president. The divisions this time were not Christian-Muslim, but pro-American 
against pro-Syrian-Iranian. Again the Lebanese could not agree on their national outlook.  
The elements of the recent conflict do have some sectarian tint, as the majority of the 
Sunnis back the pro-American pro-independence government while the majority of the 
Shias back the pro-Syrian pro-Iranian opposition. The Christians are divided between 
these two groups.  
In 2008, Hizbullah took over Beirut in protest over the Lebanese government‘s 
decision to ban Hizbullah‘s closed circuit telephone system and remove the security chief 
at the Beirut airport.
214
 The subsequent events are outside of the scope of this paper, but 
the Lebanese were able to avert another civil war and eventually agreed on a president 
after meeting in Doha, Qatar.
215
 The government gave in to the opposition and Hizbullah 
gained veto power over any decisions of the majority government. Sectarian tensions 
remain as high as ever especially with the heightened sensitivities of what is going on in 
Iraq – the Shias are encouraged by the ascendency of their brethren in Iraq, the Iranian-
American rivalry over regional politics, and the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
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The majority government, mainly Sunnis, Druz and Maronites, is supported by 
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The opposition, mainly Shia and some Maronites, is supported 
by Iran and Syria. The social, economic and political conditions in 2010 are reminiscent 
of those before 1975. Even if Lebanon manages to avoid another civil war, unless the 
underlying causes are addressed, with or without external help,
216
 the country faces the 
risk of reverting to armed conflict sooner or later. 
                                                 
216
 If past history is of any significance, it is doubtful that the Lebanese will be able to resolve their 
problems independently. To stop intra-Lebanese violence, the French and Ottomans had to interfere in 
1860, the Americans had to interfere in 1958, the Syrians in 1976 and then in 1990. All major post-
independence agreements were the result of foreign mediation signed on foreign soil: Cairo Agreement of 
1969, Ta‘if Agreement (Saudi Arabia) of 1989, and the Doha Agreement of 2008.  
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